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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This matter 
was subsequently assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the appellants' ("Troy's") defenses raised on 
the same notes and transactions sued on by the appellee ("Bank") 
should have been dismissed on summary judgment pursuant to the 
four-year statute of limitations (78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended) based upon the second sentence of Section 78-12-44 
U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
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This issue was ruled on in summary judgment, therefore, the 
standard of review is de novo. The appellate court is to apply 
the same standard as that applied by the trial court. Durham v. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The appellate court views 
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party belowf 
(Troy) in determining whether those facts require, as a matter of 
law, the entry of judgment for the prevailing party below. The 
appellate court is to give no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same 
notes and transactions sued on by the Bank, should have been 
dismissed on summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of 
limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
The standard of review on this issue is de novo. The 
appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by 
the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, supra, 1332. 
3. Whether the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims, alleged 
to have occurred in November of 1988, well into the four-year 
limitation period, was appropriate on summary judgment based upon 
the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended• 
The standard of review on this issue is de novo. The 
appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by 
the trial court. Durham v. Margetts, Id. at 1332. 
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4. Whether there were genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to Troy's Counterclaims remaining after the court's 
ruling on the statutes of limitation issues (limited to Counts 
Five and Six as relating to the November 1988 loan) to preclude 
summary judgment being entered on those claims. 
The standard of review on this issue is de novo. The 
appellate court is to apply the same standard as that applied by 
the trial court. Durham v. Marcretts, Id. at 1332. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case and Course of Proceeding: 
This case involves the relationship and the solicitation and 
funding of bank loans from the appellee (plaintiff —State Bank 
of Southern Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Bank") to the 
appellants (defendants —Troy Hygro et. al.., hereinafter referred 
to as "Troy" or "Troy Defendants") to construct a greenhouse 
facility in the New Castle area in Western Iron County, Southern 
Utah. 
Troy intended to borrow $170,000 for this project. However, 
for various reasons and problems, as set forth below in the 
Statement of Facts, this amount increased to $325,000. The Bank 
in May of 1985 committed to disburse this amount to Troy 
immediately upon SBA approval ("initial loan") however, the Bank 
failed to disburse the funds as promised. The Bank eventually 
disbursed the funds in October of 1985. As a result of this 
delay problems with the New Castle project arose as set forth 
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below in the Statement of Facts. Subsequent loans were made to 
Troy by the Bank, including one for $60,000 on February 10, 1987 
("1987 loan") and one for $49,000 to the Troy Defendants Keith 
and Karen Sue Kehl in November of 1988 ("1988 loan"). Troy 
contends and has maintained from the beginning that as a result 
of the problems starting with the delayed disbursement of the 
initial loan the matter became the Bank's problem. The Bank 
acknowledged this and attempted a number of ways to remedy the 
problem over a period of years, including the 1987 and 1988 
loans. These attempts did not fully remedy the problem. The 
Bank then commenced this action seeking the collection of the 
initial loan and the 1987 and 1988 loans. 
The Troy Defendants responded by way of an Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging various counterclaims including: (l)Breach 
of Agreement to Fund, (2) Wilful Breach of Contract and Economic 
Duress, (3) Promissory Estoppel, (4) Negligent Structuring and 
Disbursal, (5) Control and Self-Dealing, (6) Breach of Duties of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and (7) Accounting, Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief. Similar claims were asserted by way of 
affirmative defenses contained in Troy's Answer. 
The Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking 
the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims based upon the four-year 
statute of limitation, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. The 
Bank argued that all the claims asserted by Troy began to accrue 
in September of 1985 (when SBA approval was obtained on the 
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initial loan, but the Bank didn't have the money). Troy filed 
its Answer and Counterclaim in June of 1991. 
Troy opposed the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
arguing, among other things, that there was a writing concerning 
the initial 1985 loan, i.e. loan documents, and thus, the six-
year statute of limitation provision (78-12-23 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended) should apply, rather than the four-
year statute. Thus, the limitation period would not have expired 
until September of 1991 three months after the Counterclaim was 
filed. Furthermore, the Bank's actions were on-going and 
continuing with actions taking place as late as November 1988, as 
set forth in the Statement of Facts below, well into the four-
year limitation period. 
The court heard the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on June 24, 1992. The Motion was heard in two stages; 
first the court heard argument on the statutes of limitation 
issue, then heard further argument on the facts, following the 
court's interim ruling on the statutes of limitation. (June 24, 
1992, Transcript, Exhibit "A", pages 3, 4 & 5). In its interim 
ruling the court granted the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment with respect to the initial 1985 loan and the agreement 
to fund upon SBA approval on grounds of the four-year statute of 
limitation. (June 24, 1992, Transcript pages 52 & 53). The 
court granted the Motion with respect to counts One, Two and 
Three of the Counterclaim dismissing them based on the statutes 
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of limitation except in relation to the 1987 loan for wrongful 
disbursement. (June 24, 1992 Transcript page 54). Count four 
was totally dismissed based on the statutes of limitation (June 
24, 1992, Transcript page 56) and the remaining Counts, Five and 
Six, were dismissed, except for the November 1988 loan, based 
upon the four-year limitation period. (June 24, 1992 transcript 
page 57 through 60). 
After the courts ruling on the statutes of limitation 
issue, the argument and facts presented to the court, were 
limited to the disbursement of the February 1987 loan and the 
November 1988 loan. (June 24, 1992 Transcript page 77). At the 
conclusion of the hearing, Count One was dismissed except for the 
wrongful disbursement of the February 1987 loan. (June 24, 1992 
transcript page 84). Counts Two and Three, which were previously 
limited to the 1987 loan disbursement, were totally dismissed. 
(June 24, 1992 transcript page 85) Count Four had already been 
dismissed by the court based on the statute of limitations. 
(June 24 1992 transcript page 86-87). Counts Five and Six 
remained dismissed except for the 1988 loan. 
The court took under advisement the Motion with respect to 
Counts One relating to the disbursement of the 1987 loan, and 
Counts Five and Six in relation to the November 1988 loan. The 
court then dismissed Count One except for the issue whether the 
disbursement of the February 1987 loan constituted a breach of 
contract; and dismissed the remainder of Counts Five and Six 
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which were in relation to the November 1988 loan. See Order 
dated June 24, 1992. (Exhibit "B"). 
The Bank then sought the dismissal of Troy's defenses by 
filing another Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based upon the 
statutes of limitation as before. Troy opposed the motion 
arguing, among other things, that a party's defenses to an action 
are not subject to and therefore cannot be barred by the statutes 
of limitation; and even if they were the same limitation period 
should be applied to the defenses (the six-year limitation period 
in this case) as to the action brought. Troy also argued that 
summary judgment was not appropriate for the factual issues 
pertaining to Troy's tort claims. 
The hearing on this Motion was held on October 9, 1992, and 
the court granted the Bank's Motion and dismissed Troy's defenses 
based upon the statutes of limitation. In doing so the court 
relied on the last sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. which 
deals with the effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to 
pay. (October 9, 1992 transcript, Exhibit "C", page 32). The 
statute specifically provides as follows: 
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to 
pay. In any case founded on contract, when any part of the 
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment 
of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay 
the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within 
the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise 
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. 
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any 
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or 
around of defense, [underlining added] 
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The court in its analysis of the last sentence of this 
Statute stated that, "it appears that the last sentence goes 
beyond the purpose of the paragraph itself." (October 9, 1992 
transcript page 32-33) This was agreed to by the Bank's 
attorney, Mr. Higbee. (October 9, 1992 transcript page 33). The 
court took the matter under advisement. However, the court 
stated that it was inclined to dismiss the defenses based upon 
the same reasons the court dismissed the Counterclaim. (October 
9, 1992 transcript page 68). 
The court entered an Order dated November 13, 1992 granting 
plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment consistent with 
the court's previous findings. The only issues left for trial 
was the amount of attorney's fees and the improper disbursement 
of the February 1987 loan. See Order dated November 13, 1992. 
(Exhibit "D") 
The trial was held on December 10, 1992, limited to these 
issues. (December 10, 1992 transcript, Exhibit "E", pages 5-6) 
At the trial Troy was precluded from presenting evidence 
concerning anything other than the disbursement of the 1987 loan 
based upon the court's prior rulings on summary judgment. 
(December 10, 1992 transcript page 38). Because of the court's 
prior rulings on summary judgment the court never considered the 
facts relating to Troy's defenses or Counterclaim. The Troy 
Defendants appeal from both of the court's rulings on summary 
judgment. 
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Statement of Facts: 
1. Troy intended to borrow $170,000 to build greenhouses 
in the New Castle area. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 159-160, 163). Troy 
owned land in the area and was leasing land adjacent thereto from 
Mr. Boyd Christensen. Troy was operating greenhouses which it 
previously built on the Christensen property. Troy intended to 
build additional greenhouses on their property. Troy did not 
want to purchase more property, but wanted to make use of the 
idle property already available in the area. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 
115, 157-166, 195; June 199^ Affidavit of M. Kehl para. 3; 
Markell Depo. pages 33-35). 
2. The business plans and proformas for costs and income 
projection submitted were based upon a loan of $170,000. 
(Markell Depo. pages 197-198; M.Kehl Depo. pages 33-381 156-166). 
Furthermore, the proformas indicated to the Bank the time 
restrictions placed on the project. (Markell Depo, page 57 & 
123). Construction on the greenhouses was to commence by the end 
of July 1985. (Markell Depo page 56). 
3. During this period of time, Christensen suddenly 
requested that Troy purchase the property it had been leasing for 
a purchase price of $150,000. (Markell Depo. page 41). Troy did 
not believe that there was any way to borrow the $170,000 fcr the 
construction of new greenhouses and purchase the Christensen 
property for $150,000. (Markell Depo. pages 40-44, 161) The 
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project was dead and over, an impossibility as far as Troy was 
concerned. (Markell Depo. page 49; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl par. 4). 
4. At that point, the Bank (Officer, Lee Fife) intervened 
and encouraged and pressured Troy to pursue the matter advising 
Troy that it should borrow the $325,000 ($150,000 to purchase 
Christensen's property and $170,000 build the greenhouses) for 
the same purpose and collateral offered for the $170,000 loan. 
(M.Kehl Depo. page 192). Troy consulted with the Bank regarding 
the value of the property located here in Utah and the Bank 
insisted that Troy could borrow the $325,000. (M.Kehl Depo pages 
191-194; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 4; Markell Depo. pages 33-
38). 
5. The Bank stated that it would take care of everything 
so Troy could get the loan, including filling out the necessary 
loan documents and forms, and dealing with the Small Business 
Administration ("SBAM). Troy looked towards the Bank as its 
financial advisor on the New Castle project and representative 
before the SBA. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 191-194; June 1992 Aff. 
M.Kehl para. 5; Markell Depo. pages 33-38). 
6. As an officer at the Bank, Mr. Fife obtained an 
appraisal on the property from Mr. Jack H. Carpenter, a Certified 
Appraiser in Cedar City, valuing the property at $562,000 as of 
May 3, 1985. See copy of May 7, 1985 letter. (Exhibit "F"). 
The Bank provided this appraisal to the SBA in support of the 
loan. (The loan was guaranteed by the SBA at 90%). In May of 
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1985, the Bank promised and committed to Troy that the money 
would be available to them immediately upon SBA approval. 
(M.Kehl Depo. page 199; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 6-8). The 
Bank continually represented to Troy that the funds would be 
available immediately upon SBA approval. (Markell Depo. pages 
34,39, 49-53, 59-69). 
1. This commitment was known to the Bank as evidenced in 
the Affidavit of Lee Fife, wherein he states that contrary to the 
Bank's commitment, the money was not available upon SBA approval. 
See copy of Affidavit of Lee Fife, paragraphs 14 & 15. (Exhibit 
MG M). At no time prior to the SBA approval did the Bank tell or 
inform Troy that the money may not be available immediately upon 
SBA approval. (Markell Depo. pages 34,39, 49-53, 59-69; June 1992 
Aff. M.Kehl para. 7-8). 
8. After this time the Bank became even more involved in 
the financing of the project. The involvement of Troy became 
more of simply obtaining instructions from the Bank. (M.Kehl 
Depo. page 202). Troy proceeded with the steps necessary to 
complete the loan as instructed by the Bank. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 
199-202). 
9. Troy continually informed the Bank of the time 
limitations and the need to obtain the money immediately upon SBA 
approval to commence with construction before winter weather and 
that any delay by the Bank would result in miserable working 
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conditions and effect the planting of the crop and thus 
jeopardize the overall project. (Markell Depo. pages 65-76). 
10. After SBA approval was obtained the Bank failed to loan 
the money to Troy as promised. (Affidavit of Lee Fife, 
paragraphs 13 & 14, Exhibit "G"; Markell Depo., pages 65-80, June 
1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 9). It was not until later that Troy 
discovered that the Bank did not have the money to lend. 
(Affidavit Lee Fife, paragraph 13, Exhibit "6"; Markell Depo. 
page 81). 
11. The Bank did eventually disburse the funds; however, 
the Bank's delay resulted in a variety of problems, including 
those which Troy had continually warned the Bank about. As a 
result construction was delayed as well as the planting of the 
tomato crop resulting in loss profits, increased expenses and 
cash flow problems on the New Castle project. (Markell Depo 
pages 93-98, 195; M.Kehl Depo. pages 246-291; 268-269; June 1992 
Aff. M.Kehl para. 9-10). 
12. The Bank realizing that it was responsible for these 
problems tried to remedy the situation by loaning Troy an 
additional $60,000 in February of 1987. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 267-
274; June 1992 Aff. M.Kehl para. 11; Markell Depo. page 104). 
The Bank realized that it was responsible for the problem. 
(Affidavit of Lee Fife, para. 13; M.Kehl Depo. pages 286-287; 
Markell Depo. page 105). The $60,000 loan was directly 
15 
attributed to the Bank's delay in disbursing the funds. (Markell 
Depo. page 113) 
13. As evidence of the parties' relationship and the Bank's 
control over the Troy Defendants, the $60,000 loan was totally 
controlled and manipulated by the Bank. The settlement records 
for the $60,000 loan prepared by the Bank contain fictitious 
payments shown to be false by later accounting. (June 1992 Aff• 
M.Kehl para. 12-18) See Settlement Papers (Exhibit "HM) compared 
to letter dated February 20, 1987 (Exhibit "I"). The Settlement 
Papers further show receipt of funds on February 20, 1987 even 
though the documents were signed ten days earlier on February 10, 
1987. The $60,000 was evidently used to pay off loans with the 
Bank contrary to representations made to the SBA and in the 
Settlement Papers. 
14. The $60,000 loan did not remedy the problems caused by 
the Bank and the Bank continued to exercise its control over the 
project to remedy the situation. (M.Kehl Depo. pages 283-292). 
The Bank continued to come up with a number of creative financing 
packages for this purpose. 
15. In November of 1988, the Bank in another attempt to 
remedy the situation put together another loan this time for 
Keith and Karen Sue Kehl with the Five County Association of 
Governments. The money was for the purchase of a delivery van 
($21,000) and so Keith Kehl could lease the New Castle site. 
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(Markell Depo., pages 166-167). As part of the loan package Troy 
Hygro Systems Inc., put up $20,000 in equity. 
16. There were also problems with this loan as the $20,000 
put up by Troy Hygro Systems Inc., went directly to pay off the 
Bank. Troy Hygro Systems Inc., was not the borrower on this 
loan, yet was listed as the borrower on the majority of the loan 
documents. Keith and Karen Sue Kehl were not liable on the 
previous SBA loans, however, the Bank in execution of this loan 
had Keith and Karen Sue Kehl sign personally on the previous SBA 
loans• 
17. The Bank provided further forms of creative financing 
after November of 1988, which included unsecured loans to the 
employees or principals of Troy Hygro Systems Inc., personally 
who with the Bank's knowledge and approval would then deposit the 
money at the Bank to make an SBA payment. Such loans were made 
to Donald Kehl and Jim Markell. (Markell Depo., pages 112, 134 
and 137) . 
18. The Bank by its continuing actions was allowed to 
control and manipulate the situation and delay its accounting to 
Troy, the SBA and bank regulators. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1* Troy's defenses raised on the same notes and 
transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed 
on summary judgment pursuant to the four-year statute of 
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limitations (78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) based upon the 
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A* 1953 as amended. 
a. A statute of limitation as a general rule is not a bar 
to asserting a claim as a defense. The Troy Defendants are 
entitled to their claims to the extent of the amount claimed by 
the Bank regardless of the statute of limitations period. 
b. The second sentence of 78-12-44 pertains to the effect 
of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay as addressed in the 
first sentence and the heading of the statute. It was not 
intended to change or circumvent the long-standing rule that 
defenses are not barred by the statute of limitations. 
2. Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same notes and 
transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed 
based upon the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25 U.C.A. 
1953 as amended. 
a. The Counterclaims are based upon loan transactions for 
which there is a sufficient writing for the six-year limitation 
period to be applied. 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
b. The Counterclaims are based upon transactions and a 
relationship with the Bank which continued through November of 
1988 and thereafter, with the Bank's action falling well within 
the four-year limitation period. 
3. There are genuine issues of material fact relating to 
Troy's claims not barred by the statute of limitations (limited 
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to Counts Five and Six relating to the 1988 loan) but dismissed 
on summary judgment, to preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
a. There are material issues of fact concerning the 
Bank's relationship to the Troy Defendants at the time of the 
1988 loan. 
b. There are material issues of fact regarding the 
Bank's actions with respect to the 1988 loan. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENSES RAISED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
As a general rule the statute of limitations do not apply to 
defenses raised by a party. Smith v. Idaho St. Univ. Federal 
Credit Union. 760 P.2d 19 (Id. 1988). The statute of limitations 
never run against defenses arising out of a transaction sued 
upon. Alles-Chalmers Corp. v. City of North Bonneville, 775 P.2d 
953 (Wash. 1989). Cf. Viehwev v. Thompson, 647 P.2d 311 (Id.App. 
1982); Warren v. Washington Trust Bank, 575 P.2d 1077 (Wash.App. 
1978) and Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Apodaca, 524 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 
1974). There is no statute of limitations for filing defenses, 
so long as the main action itself is timely. Seattle First 
National Bank, N.A. v. Siebol. 824 P.2d 1252, review denied 833 
P.2d 386 (Wash.App. 1992). Such defense survives as long as 
plaintiff's claim can be asserted, even though defendant's claim 
would be otherwise time barred by the statute of limitations if 
brought as an affirmative defense. Aetna Finance Co. v. 
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Pasauali. 626 P.2d 1103 (Ariz.App. 1981). The statute of 
Limitations is available only as a shield and not as a sword. 
Dredge Corp. v. Wells Fargo. Inc.. 389 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1964). 
This general rule is applicable to instances where an 
untimely claim is raised as a defense to a suit on a promissory 
note, Dawe v. Merchants Mortg. and Trust Corp.. 683 P.2d 796 on 
remand 754 P.2d 418 (Colo. 1984). For a case on point see 
Seattle First National Bank v. Siebol. supra. (Exhibit "J") 
dealing with a bank loan where the borrowers alleged that the 
bank breached an oral promise to provide financing as an 
affirmative defense in an action by the bank to recover on loans 
made to the borrowers. The trial court in that case held that 
although the statute of limitation time had expired, the statutes 
of limitation never run against defenses arising out of a 
transaction sued upon. The trial court allowed the defenses in 
and granted the borrowers a set off for lost profits based on the 
borrower/s defenses. This ruling was affirmed by the Washington 
Court of Appeals. Id. 
This general rule is recognized and followed in the State of 
Utah. Jacobsen v. Bunker.1 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985); (Exhibit 
MKM) (although party was not entitled to affirmative relief 
because it was time barred, party was entitled to defense up to 
*• Jacobsen v. Bunker, supra. actually involved California 
law, but the Supreme Court presumed it to be the same as Utah law 
and thus, ruled in accordance with Utah law. 
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the amount of the note). This position was raised by memoranda 
and argued before the court. (October 9, 1992 transcript pages 
32-35). The court acknowledged this general principle, i.e. that 
the statutes of limitation do not apply to the defenses of an 
action. (October 9, 1992 transcript page 34). 
The court however ultimately ruled that Troy's defenses were 
barred by the statutes of limitation. The basis of this ruling 
was the last sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended, which provides as follows, "When a right of action is 
barred by the provision of any statute, it shall be unavailable 
either as a cause of action or ground of defense." (October 9, 
1993 transcript page 32). The court immediately realized that 
interpreting this second sentence as proposed by the Bank, took 
the sentence way out of the purpose of the paragraph and even the 
statute itself. (October 9, 1993 transcript page 33). The 
Bank's position took the sentence totally out of context simply 
arguing that, "it says what it says." (October 9, 1992 
transcript page 33). 
The court was correct in its initial impression of the 
statute. Under general rules of construction and interpretation, 
a sentence contained in a writing should not be isolated, but 
should be considered in reference to the writing as a whole. 
Barnhart v. McKinnev. 682 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984). The trial court 
erred in isolating and then applying the second sentence of 
Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., dealing with the effect of payment, 
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acknowledgment or promise to pay, to circumvent the long-standing 
principle and general rule that the statutes of limitation do not 
apply to a defense to an action that has been brought. This 
constitutes a mistake of law. It prejudiced the Troy Defendants 
and requires a reversal of the court's order granting summary 
judgment on Troy's defenses. 
The provisions in Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., enacted in 1951, 
are intended for cases dealing with the effect of acknowledgment 
or part payment on the tolling of the statutes of limitation. It 
is to limit the common law rule regarding the tolling of the 
statutes of limitation, which tolls the limitation period in all 
actions, in cases of acknowledgment or part payment. 78-12-44 
U.C.A. is intended to restrict the tolling to only those actions 
founded upon contract, Yeraensen v. Ford, 402 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1965) and further provides that such acknowledgment must be in 
writing signed by the party to be charged thereby. This limited 
purpose is supported by subsequent case law. 
In Yeraensen v. Ford. 402 P.2d 696 (Utah 1965)(Exhibit "L") 
the Utah Supreme Court actually interpreted the last sentence of 
Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. The Court limited its interpretation to 
the effect of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay. The 
Court found that, "a reasonable interpretation of the last 
sentence of this statute would compel the conclusion that any 
statute which bars a right of action is conclusive unless its 
operation is suspended by the specific provisions of 78-12-44. 
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Id. at 697. Therefore, if the provisions of 78-12-44 U.C.A. are 
not met the statutes of limitation will not be tolled. No one in 
this case has claimed that the statutes of limitation should be 
tolled under this provision. Therefore, the second sentence of 
this provision should not be pulled out to bar any claimed 
defenses by the Troy Defendants. 
Furthermore, there was no finding by the Court that the 
second sentence meant that the statutes of limitations all of a 
sudden applied to defenses of a claim. This would have been a 
substantial change meriting some finding by the Court. There was 
no finding that this sentence forever changed the long-standing 
principle that the statutes of limitation do not apply against 
defenses to an action. Moreoverf there are no statutes of 
limitation, and none have been adopted, barring the right to 
raise a defense to an action. 
In addition, the second sentence of this statute has never 
been given such a wide interpretation as to replace or supersede 
the general rule or principle that the statutes of limitation do 
not apply to defenses. The fact that defenses are not subject to 
the statutes of limitation continues to be the general rule, and 
continues to be the general rule in the State of Utah. Utah 
courts have so held since 78-12-44 U.C.A was enacted in 1951. 
See Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) (Exhibit "KM); 
Seattle First National Bank, N.A. v. Siebol, supra. (Exhibit "J") 
and other cases following this general rule which have been cited 
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above2. To hold otherwise would totally circumvent the long-
standing principle concerning defenses and the statutes of 
limitation, and also undermine the important principles of due 
process and a desired trial on the merits. 
II. TROY'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Troy's Counterclaims should not have been dismissed based 
upon the four-year statute of limitations. The Counterclaims are 
based upon the same transactions and loans documents that the 
Bank is suing on therefore, there is a sufficient writing for the 
six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to apply.3 
The Bank's argument on this point is that there is not an 
exact term in writing regarding the Bank's, now undisputed 
promised/ to have the funds available immediately upon SBA 
approval. (June 24, 1992 transcript pages 22-23). However, it 
is not necessary that the exact term sought to be enforced be in 
writing for the six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to 
apply; it can even be oral, as long as it relates to or grows out 
of a written instrument. Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms. 499 P.2d 
2
. It is worthy to note that the Bank has failed to cite any 
cases holding that the second sentence of 78-12-44 U.C.A. is a bar 
to raising a defense to an action after the statutes of limitation 
have run. Absent such a showing, the general principle should 
remain intact. 
3
. If the six-year provision is applied the Counterclaim 
filed June 1991 would be timely even under the Bank's argument that 
the time for filing commenced September 5, 1985. 
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273 (Utah 1972); (Exhibit "M") . In Pickett Bros. Farms the 
actual obligation arose out of an oral promise made to pay the 
plaintiff while the parties were negotiating a written contract. 
The Court found that the obligation to pay and breach thereof 
arose out of the written contract the parties later agreed to and 
the Court imposed the six-year limitation period. .Id. at 275. In 
this case, there is a writing concerning the initial $325,000 
loan. The Bank agreed to disburse the funds for the initial loan 
upon SBA approval. The Bank however failed to do so and delayed 
in disbursing the funds as provided for in the written loan 
instruments. This failure or breach relates to the written loan 
documents and thus falls within the six-year statute of 
limitations provision. 
Even if the four-year limitation period is applied Troy's 
Counterclaims are based upon numerous transactions and its on-
going relationship with the Bank which commenced in 1985 and 
continued through November 1988 and thereafter. (See Statement 
of Facts Nos. 15-18) Therefore, Troy's Counterclaim dealing with 
the November 1988 loan should not have been dismissed by the 
court on summary judgment based on the four-year limitation 
period4. 
4
. The trial court did not even consider issues of fact in 
regards to these claims, because it previously ruled that the 
claims were barred by the statutes of limitation. 
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III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT RELATING 
TO THE LIMITED CLAIMS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BUT DISMISSED 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There are genuine issues of material fact relating to the 
limited claims not barred by the statute of limitations, but 
dismissed on summary judgment. These limited claims are Count 
Five for Control and Self-dealing and Count Six for Breaches of 
Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
As set forth above in the Statement of Facts, the Bank's 
relationship and action with Troy was continuing and continued 
well into November of 1988. The delay in funding the initial 
loan for $325,000 was only the start of a continuing 
relationship, which evolved into a deeper relationship, involving 
other loans and actions by the Bank, giving rise to allegations 
of control and self-dealing and breaches of good faith and fair 
dealing. This was all subsequent to September of 1985 and 
continued through November of 1988. 
The Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was to resolve 
the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the $60,000 loan 
was not made until February 10, 1987. Again in November of 1988, 
the Bank made loans to the defendants and materially changed the 
terms of the original loan documents. (Statement of Facts Nos. 
15, 16 & 17) This action occurred in November of 1988 and 
certainly presents an issue of fact on the November 1988 loan in 
relation to Troy's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Control and Self-
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dealing and Breaches of Good-faith and Fair dealing. These 
counts should not have been dismissed by the court on summary 
judgment. 
There is also an issue of fact as to whether a special or 
fiduciary relationship was developed between the Bank and the 
Troy Defendants. Although a lender is generally not in a 
fiduciary position, facts and circumstances often arise which 
create a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship does 
arise when the banks become financial advisors. This is 
particularly true when there has been a relationship established 
for a period of time, justifying the customer's reliance on the 
Bank to act in his best interest. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 
64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 
(Mont. 1984). In the instant case, Troy relied on the Bank to 
act in its best interest. The Bank failed to properly disburse 
funds to Troy and was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on 
how to generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate 
the problems. The Bank is also a fiduciary to Troy pursuant to 
statute, as the trustee on the deeds of trust securing the loans 
in this case. Section 22-1-1 et. seq. U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
The Bank also exercised control over the Troy which is 
sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary relationship. A.G. Jensen 
Farms Co. v. Carqill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). The 
Bank's control and dominance over Troy was so substantial that 
Troy's operations and affairs in Utah rested totally in the 
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control of the Bank. Troy is an out-of-state family run business 
and relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise. This 
was especially true since Troy ran into its problems as a result 
of the Bank's failure to timely fund the initial loan. Troy 
relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to remedy 
the situation. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself 
first from the proceeds of the November 1988 loan, contrary to 
what was represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to 
Troy. This alone raises issues of fact concerning the Bank's 
self dealing. Rosenberaer v. Herbert. 232 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1967). 
A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith and scrupulous 
honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to made good faith 
disclosures of all facts relevant to the transaction." Kirbv v. 
Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 1985); Mevers v. Moody, 693 
F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). The Bank breached its duty to 
disclose all relevant information to Troy in this case and Troy's 
claim for control and self dealing should not have been dismissed 
on summary judgment. 
Moreover, factual issues are present in this case invoking 
the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.Rptr. 
123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.. Inc. v. Standard 
Oil Co.. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984). For one, the parties were 
in inherently unequal bargaining positions. This is particularly 
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true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial funds, which 
put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and subject to 
the Bank's control. Second, Troy was especially vulnerable 
because of the harm it would suffer if the Bank refused to remedy 
the situation as a result it had to place a great deal of trust 
in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was aware of Troy's 
vulnerability. All of these factual issues are relevant 
concerning the Bank's fiduciary duty to Troy and the breach of 
the Bank's duty of good faith and fair dealing occurring on the 
November 1988 loan; therefore, the Bank's motion for summary 
judgment on these claim should not have been granted. Wallis v. 
Superior Court. 207 Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct 
Buying Serv.. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 
1984) 
CONCLUSION 
The defenses raised by Troy are not subject to the statutes 
of limitation and should not have been dismissed on summary 
judgment. Troy's Counterclaim should not have been dismissed on 
summary judgment. The trial court's granting of summary judgment 
on these issues should be reversed. 
The Final Judgment, Decree and Order of Foreclosure entered 
by the District Court should be set aside. The case should be 
remanded back to the District Court for a trial on the merits 
with Troy's defenses and Counterclaim intact. 
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DATED this day of October, 1993. 
BROWN & BROWN, P.C. 
Budge W. Call, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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CEDAR CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, JUNE 24, 1992 
-oOo-
THE COURT: The matter is before the Court on 
Plaintiff's — or rather Defendants' — yeah — Plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim in State 
Bank of Southern Utah versus Troy Hygro Systems, Inc. 
Have we lost counsel for — 
MR. HIGBEE: Mr. Call just hustled out to get 
his briefcase, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I see. All right. 
MR. CALL: Sorry. 
THE COURT: Tell me your name. 
MR. CALL: Budge Call. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. CALL: On behalf of the defendants. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Higbee for the plaintiff, I 
| guess? And in this case, we're just dealing with the 
counterclaim; so, it's counterclaimant and 
counter-defendant. 
MR. HIGBEE: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Are both counsel ready to proceed? 
MR. HIGBEE: The plaintiff is prepared to go, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Call, are you ready to go? 
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MR. CALL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, by way of suggestion, I'm 
wondering if it would make sense to argue this in two 
stages dealing first with the — what's usually a threshold 
issue, and that's the statute of limitations issue and give 
an opportunity, since attention spans are not as long 
sometimes as they are when we're younger, to give attorneys 
on both sides a chance to rebut on that point and not have 
to try to keep it in mind while a lot of other matters are 
being covered. 
Do counsel agree with that? 
MR. HIGBEE: That would be fine, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And then go on to the more 
substantive matters after that. 
MR. HIGBEE: That would be great. 
MR. CALL: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. And since you're the 
moving party, Mr. Higbee, you may proceed. 
MR. HIGBEE: I will, Your Honor. There are a 
couple of preliminary matters that I need — one, 
specifically. I received — I was in St. George all day 
yesterday on some depositions in another matter. And when 
I got to my office this morning, I found that I had 
received in yesterday's mail an Affidavit of Michael Kehl 
in opposition to this motion. And I'd like for the record 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
4 
to object to the Affidavit and move to strike it on the 
grounds that it does not meet the evidentiary rules 
required by Rule 56. As Your Honor well knows, it must 
meet the substantive evidentiary requirements. 
Generally stated, the gist of the objection goes 
to lack of foundation and improper conclusions in summaries 
rather than statements of fact that would be admissible at 
trial. There are several conclusions set forth in the 
Affidavit without the supporting facts upon which those 
conclusions are based. I'd be happy to address them one 
paragraph at a time, or I can just state them generally as 
I've indicated, and Your Honor can deal with it in the 
course of the presentation. 
THE COURT: Well, before I have you respond, 
Mr. Call, I read the Affidavits just before court. My 
impression is that the matter presented in them generally 
doesn't bear on the statute of limitations issue, is that 
correct, but rather on the substantive issues? 
MR. HIGBEE: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, perhaps we can — we can 
defer. It would take a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis. I 
noticed in places, the language was couched in terms of 
Troy said this or did this. And obviously it's a 
corporation. It would have had to have been represented by 
a person who could be a witness in court. And so some of 
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those things, I suppose, we'd have to come to grips with. 
But there may — rather than doing it now, why don't we 
defer the ruling and even further argument on the motion 
until after the — the statute of limitations matters have 
been presented. 
MR. HIGBEE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MR. CALL: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. That means that you'll have 
to remember that it's pending. 
MR. HIGBEE: As long as I've got my motion on 
the record, we'll hit it when it comes up, I'm sure, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HIGBEE: I apologize for not having that in 
writing. I — the motion. I just didn't have time to get 
it here. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HIGBEE: With -- with Your Honor's 
indulgence, I would like to — to take just a minute and 
outline for the Court who the players are, and who the 
parties are so Your Honor has those players clearly in mind 
as we talk about who said this, and when they said it, and 
when we quote from depositions, Your Honor will know who 
we're talking about. 
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settlement sheet signed by Mike Kehl saying where the 
$60,000 loan went. Part of the loan documentation. In 
Mike Kehl's Affidavit, he states that he didn't — he 
didn't sign that when that was filled in. There was a 
letter from the bank sent to Troy stating that the loan — 
the $60,000 loan was disbursed directly, contrary — 
another writing — a letter telling them how the loan was 
disbursed, which is directly contrary to the settlement 
statement that he — that he signed. 
I don't see how he can say that we can't point 
to any written documentation showing that they didn't 
disburse the funds as they agreed. And when there's two 
different contradictory writinas- themselves — two writings 
themselves that contradict. 
THE COURT: All right. I think we've probably 
adequately addressed that one. Let me make an interim 
ruling on this, because it may slim down the arguments from 
here on out. 
The motion for partial summary judgment — and 
I'm going to partially grant the motion for partial summary 
judgment with respect to the — basically the — what 
appeared to me when I reviewed the file as the main thrust 
of the cause of action, the breach of the agreement to fund 
upon approval of SBA. I'm going to grant with respect to 
that matter on grounds of being barred by the four-year 
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statute of limitation, the motion for partial summary 
judgment. The attempts to relate back or somehow include 
that in some later arising six-year statute do not appear 
to the Court to be in accordance with the — my 
understanding of the law. 
Also we're dealing with two separate contracts. 
And that would also be a finding that I would make in 
support of this ruling to that point, back in 1985, the 
basic loan agreement, and something that is separate from 
that, and that is the timing of — time is of the essence 
type of argument that whether it conflicts with it or not 
at least was not part of the written agreement. And it 
appears to the Court that that also has to be in writing to 
get the advantage of the six-year statute. That it doesn't 
under any theory of the law that I'm aware of in any way 
merge with the written contract. 
So I'm granting the motion with respect to 
counts one, two and three of the counterclaim with respect 
to the transaction in 1985. 
And I have some trouble with the transaction in 
1987, which was a written transaction. And in that case, 
as I'm sure my questions have indicated, it appears to me 
that the disbursement — when we're going to matters or 
questions of disbursement or breach arising from the manner 
of disbursement, we have left the ground of contract, and 
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we're now in the area of performance where the statute of 
limitations would not apply. Well, it applies to the 
timing of the breach, but there would be the advantage 
there that if the original contract, which is alleged to 
have been breached, is in writing, that then the six-year 
statute applies. And of course we're still within that 
six-year statute. And so I'm denying the motion with 
respect to the February loan and again limiting it with 
respect to the allegation that the breach consists of 
wrongful disbursement. 
That is — I realize that we're going to be 
arguing other things, but that's just in the statute of 
limitations field right now. 
MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor, it occurs to me that 
there's one aspect that — that maybe we didn't fully 
address. They claim other things in connection with the 
February 20th, 1987 loan. They claim negligence, and they 
claim breach of duty of good faith, and they claim 
control. It seems to me those are not claims founded on an 
instrument in writing, that the instrument in writing is 
only relating to contract claims. In fact, I believe 
that's what the statute says. I think it says — and so — 
THE COURT: Now ~ 
MR. HIGBEE: — we still need to address the 
issues of the negligence, the bad faith and the control 
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associated with the February 20th, 1987 loan. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I was going on to that. 
MR. HIGBEE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. If you'd — 
you should have told me to sit down and be quiet. I 
wouldn't have been offended. 
THE COURT: We'll go on to count four — I have 
to separate these all in my own mind — the negligent 
structuring and disbursal of loan proceeds. 
There, I'm not — well, I just ruled, I guess, 
that for statute of limitation purposes for breach of 
contract, the six-year statute would apply to that. I'm 
not sure that a negligent claim would, because 
[ negligence — we jump over the fence to another theory that 
seems to not have the two steps of it to be covered only by 
the four-year catchall statute of limitations. Because 
when the nature of the claim is negligence, it doesn't seem 
to matter whether it arose from a written contract, from a 
car accident, from whatever. It's a negligent four-year 
animal. This hasn't been argued. But if either counsel 
has any law that bears on that, I'd be happy to hear it 
before I — I rule on that one. 
MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor, it's in the brief. The 
name of the case is Au versus Au. It's a Hawaii case. In 
that case, there was the same — a single transaction that 
gave rise to several different legal theories. And the 
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1 Court held squarely that in such a situation, the different 
2 statute of limitations apply to the different legal 
3 theories. The citation is — is 626 P.2d 173, Hawaii 
4 1981. A quote from the case. "Where two or more causes of 
5 action arise from a single transaction, different statutes 
6 of limitation are applicable to the separate" — 
7 THE COURT: Yes. I realize that general 
8 principle. But did that case involve the distinction 
9 between the type of negligence that arises from contract, 
10 and then the distinction between written and oral 
11 contract? 
12 MR. HIGBEE: It did not, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. So I'm just assuming that 
14 that does not matter. And I think that's probably 
15 correct. 
16 So with respect to count four, which appears to 
17 be a — based on negligent actions, whether those actions 
18 are the manner of disbursement — I think that that's the 
19 main thrust — or whether the making of that loan, I'm 
20 going to grant the motion for partial summary judgment, and 
21 that's ordered dismissed. 
22 Now — which brings us to the control, self 
23 dealing, breach of duty, of good faith and fair dealing. 
24 If we're dealing with, say, a — a crack in the 
25 sidewalk or something that is a single identifiable type of 
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breach of duty or negligence that continues, I think that's 
one thing. In this case, from what I've read in the file, 
it appears that we're dealing with several different types 
of things. And under those circumstances, I think that we 
have to look at each incident individually to determine 
statute of limitation questions. 
Of those incidents — specific incidents, it 
appears that only the November, '88 loan to Keith Kehl is 
within the four-year statute of limitations prior to the 
filing of the counterclaim; so, I'm granting also the 
motion for partial summary judgment with respect at this 
point to all of the matters except that particular single 
incident. 
Now, are there any others that I've missed that 
are within the statutory period that were intended to be 
included in that? I don't see them in the pleadings• 
MR. HIGBEE: They're not, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So as far as statute of 
limitations is concerned, that one is — now, the — and 
that covers both five and six. 
Now, seven, the accounting, declaratory relief 
and injunction — to clean up the pleadings, do we need to 
dismiss that one? That seems to me totally superfluous and 
unnecessary. You're entitled to — 
MR. HIGBEE: As I stated, Your Honor, we 
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obviously have to prove the balance as part of our cause, 
and we think that — that it's — I really don't know what 
they want, to be honest with you. 
THE COURT: Well, if you file a foreclosure 
action, I've never heard of an injunction being filed in 
the same court enjoining you from proceeding with its 
action. I — 
MR. HIGBEE: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I would suppose that that can be 
addressed by a motion to continue or dismiss or things 
within that action. We're not dealing with two courts, and 
of course Utah can't enjoin whatever is happening in 
Wisconsin. So — 
MR. HIGBEE: We would move to dismiss that 
claim, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. CALL: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then it's ordered dismissed 
on — well, I'm not sure what grounds. Let's see. Those 
were in Mr. Call's stipulation? 
Or do you not want to stipulate? 
MR. CALL: We can just — we'll just stipulate 
to that. 
THE COURT: Okay. We'll do that on 
stipulation. 
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So what we have left now are — 
MR. CALL: I have just one question — 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CALL: — on the negligence as to count 
four. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CALL: Now, my understanding is that the 
negligence claims were being dismissed because they were 
not in relation to the written document? 
THE COURT: Well, no. I'm accepting as — for 
purposes of argument, this point that they were in 
relationship to the written document, but that didn't turn 
them into six.year — 
MR. CALL: Right. 
THE COURT: — rather than four year. 
MR. CALL: That was my question. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. CALL: So that — as far as November, 1988, 
then., that count four would still be — still — 
THE COURT: Let's see. Now, that was included 
also in the negligence. I suppose to be consistent with 
the ~ 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: I was not aware that that was 
included in that. 
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MR- CALL: Well, it — 
MR. HIGBEE: For the record, in the 
interrogatories, they didn't say that specifically. There 
was so much cross-referencing, that perhaps that was — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. HIGBEE: — followed in. I don't know. 
THE COURT: All right. Wellf let me revise my 
ruling, then, for count four. It's dismissed except for 
the November, '88 transaction. And I hope this doesn't get 
confusing, because we'll still be arguing other matters, 
and that may cause some sort of revision. But — 
MR. HIGBEE: I'm clear — I think I'm clear on 
it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. So what do we have left? We 
have one, two, three out completely. Four out except for 
November, '88. Five and six out except for November, '88. 
And both of those deal with disbursement. 
MR. CALL: I'm sorry. You're confusing me. 
Now, my understanding is that one, two, three — 
one, two, three were out completely with respect to the '85 
transaction. 
THE COURT: Yes. You're right. You're right. 
MR. HIGBEE: And I think that's correct. 
THE COURT: Yeah. You're right. But it's still 
in with respect to the '87 and I suppose '88 transactions. 
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MR. CALL: I was going in reverse — the reverse 
order that he addressed them. So I was — 
THE COURT: So that I sort things out — 
MR. CALL: I think — I think basically most of 
our claim for the negligence and the breach of duty of good 
faith, improper control and economic duress dealt with 
the — with the previous two loans. 
As far as the — the November, 1988 loan, our — 
our claim for the negligence is the fact that Keith Kehl 
was supposed to borrow the money, and Troy was to guarantee 
it. And that was the agreement they had. However, it 
ended up that Keith — Troy borrowed the money, and Keith 
ended up guaranteeing the total SBA loan of $325,000. And 
that was on the urging and control that Lee Fife had in — 
in the Troy Hygro operation here in Utah. 
THE COURT: Assume there's all the control in 
the world involved in that transaction. In what way was — 
did any damage occur? That's the point that I think 
interests me more. 
MR. CALL: Well, as far as Keith Kehl is 
concerned, he is liable — I mean he's liable for the 
$325,000 loan, although he only received $49,000. 
THE COURT: So you're talking about the 
disbursement stage again rather than — 
MR. CALL: Right. He — well, he was 
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1 I says it's limited to $25,000 of all of the prior loans. So 
2 he's not obligated for 325, he's obligated for the 25,000. 
3 It was written in the agreement; it was signed by the 
4 parties. He obviously knew what was going on. And I can't 
5 see it — I honestly can't see a factual basis to keep that 
6 in. 
7 THE COURT: Well, now again, he knew that there 
8 had been an allegation. I'm not sure that there's much 
9 evidence yet as to — well, fraud hasn't been alleged. I 
10 should maybe go back and reread the depositions myself on 
11 that particular point, since we zeroed in on it. So I 
12 believe we'll take that one under advisement. 
13 MR. HIGBEE: So — so count one, breach of the 
14 agreement fund, is dismissed except for wrongful 
15 disbursement? 
16 THE COURT: Wrongful disbursement on the '87 
17 loan. And on the '88 loan, I will take another look at 
18 that. 
19 MR. HIGBEE: And on the '88 loan, failure — 
20 what — okay. On the '88 loan — 
21 THE COURT: See, there's not a wrongful 
22 disbursement allegation on that one, is there? 
23 MR. HIGBEE: No, sir. 
24 THE COURT: That's just simply — 
25 MR. CALL: What's -- what's that? 
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MR. HIGBEE: I say on the '88 loan, there's — 
the judge inquired if there was a claim for wrongful 
disbursement on the '88 loan. And as I understand it, 
there's not. There's just two claims that the parties were 
reversed, and that Keith Kehl was forced into signing the 
guarantee. 
MR. CALL: Yeah. That's right. The — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CALL: Maybe — it may be easier for you if 
you just — it's sort of hard on the — because all of the 
causes of action do not — 
THE COURT: Well, let me go through them. 
MR.- HIGBEE: I think the judge is on the right 
track. 
THE COURT: My ruling on the other points, and 
let me answer those questions. 
I'm going to dismiss totally count two, the 
theory of economic duress. It appears to me there's not 
even a threshold showing of that in the depositions. 
Also count three, promissory estoppel, seems 
to — as a theory, seems to relate primarily to the '85 
loan, which was has been dismissed on other grounds. So 
I'm going to also dismiss that as a theory. Also because I 
don't feel the elements are shown. 
Next, the count four, negligent disbursal. As 
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1 far as breach by wrongful disbursal, that's been preserved 
2 as a — in the '87 loan as part of count one. 
3 MR. HIGBEE: It was dismissed as to the 
4 negligence. It was kept alive as part of the contract. 
5 THE COURT: Yeah. That's right. 
6 MR. HIGBEE: So count four was dismissed. It 
7 was count one on the contract — the written document that 
8 was kept alive. 
9 THE COURT: Yes. That's it. But let me revisit 
10 the negligence for a minute and — negligence requires the 
11 existence of a duty. I'm not at this point, of course, 
12 ruling that the '87 action on the '87 contract is barred by 
13 the statute of frauds; so, that would give rise to the 
14 duty. 
15 MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor — Your Honor ruled that 
16 it was barred by statute of limitations. We've got a 
17 four-year statute of limitations on that. 
18 THE COURT: You're right. As a theory, it's 
19 barred. 
20 MR. CALL: Yeah. 
21 MR. HIGBEE: It's still alive on the contract. 
22 THE COURT: Right. 
23 MR. HIGBEE: The same — right. 
24 THE COURT: Right. I'll stay with that ruling. 
25 Now, counts five and six I've been thinking of. 
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MR. CALL: So — Tom, so count four is — 
THE COURT: Count four is totally out. 
MR. HIGBEE: Count four is negligence all the 
way through, and it's totally out on the statute of 
limitations. 
THE COURT: The November, '88 transaction, 
however, is still alive as part of count one. Or '87. 
MR. HIGBEE: '87. 
THE COURT: Yeah. The '87 transaction — loan 
transaction. But the only theory that — is the breach of 
contract through the performance. 
MR. HIGBEE: And that's on the failure to 
disburse. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
On counts five and six, I'm going to dismiss 
both of those counts except possibly for the '88 loan to 
Keith Kehl. And that's one that I want to look at also 
with respect to count one; so, that is under advisement. 
And then of course count seven has been 
dismissed on stipulation. 
MR. HIGBEE: I think that's exactly right, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? I'll try 
to — what time is it? Quarter to 4:00. I'll try to rule 
on that at one point before I leave and go back to 
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MR. HIGBEE: Thank you, Your Honor. And I was 
only saying that half facetiously. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I realize it. 
So on that point, then, the motion for partial 
summary judgment would be denied, and we'll leave that open 
for trial. 
And now we'll go ahead with your other points, 
Mr. Call. 
MR. CALL: Well, I think another thing that 
needs to be addressed, and that is the — the defenses that 
were raised. 
As far as — as I recall the last time we came 
down here on a $325,000 loan and on the $60,000 loan, in 
our memorandum, we raised arguments regarding our defenses 
and counterclaims, and the plaintiff's counsel raised the 
statute of limitations. And the Court ruled that the 
counterclaims were barred based upon the four-year 
limitation, and therefore, we never got a chance to address 
those issues. 
However, now they're taking the position that 
because of the statute of limitations, the claims were also 
barred as defenses — not only as counterclaims but also as 
defenses to the loan documents. And our position is that 
where it was — where it was their motion for summary 
judgment to dismiss our counterclaims, that may be true, 
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but whereas they're seeking summary judgment, then issues 
of fact that are raised in our defenses should be 
considered by the Court and preclude summary judgment. 
THE COURT: Well, they cite Utah 78-12-44 as 
specifically stating that if a defense is of the nature — 
or cause of action, that a ruling by the Court barring it 
under statute of limitations also makes it unavailable as a 
defense. Let me look at that. 
Have you looked into that allegation? That 
would seem to be a — 
MR. CALL: No. I just — I was just — I just 
received their reply today, and I was looking at that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I suppose even though, 
none of us have had enough time to do our homework on it, 
if it's there, and it states it that baldly, then it would 
appear to be conclusive on that issue. 78-12 — let me 
look it up here — 44. 
MR. HIGBEE: The last sentence of that 
paragraph, Your Honor. Of that section. 
THE COURT: "Effect of payment, acknowledgment 
or promise to pay. 
"In any case founded on contract, when any part 
of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability" — yeah. It 
appears this last sentence appears to go somewhat beyond 
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the purpose of the paragraph itself, doesn't it? 
MR. HIGBEE: Yeah. As I read that, Your Honor, 
that was exactly my feeling. That should have been two 
paragraphs instead of just one, because the first sentence 
and the last don't seem to relate to each other. 
But it says what it says, and it — and it seems 
to be — 
THE COURT: It doesn't specifically say it is 
limited only to a — these certain defenses. "When a right 
of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it 
should be unavailable" — of course my code here doesn't 
have the annotations. 
Are there any cases construing that? 
MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor, we don't have Shepard's 
in our — in our office. I just got Mr. Call's brief on 
Monday; so, I haven't had time to go to a law school or 
anything like that. We don't have Shepard's in our 
office. To my knowledge, there are none in all of southern 
Utah. 
But I read all of the annotations cited, and 
there's no reference to that second paragraph. All the 
annotations are to the first paragraph. Whether there's a 
case that's been decided under that that might be in the 
Shepard's that's not in the annotations, I can't say. 
THE COURT: It would seem to be anomalous to — 
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MR. CALL: Well — 
THE COURT: — to allow a defense that isf say, 
like payment in the nature of an offset that has already 
been adjudicated as a — beyond the statute of 
limitations. On the other hand — let me think this 
through. 
MR. CALL: If I — if I could, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
MR. CALL: If I could, Your Honor, in — in my 
research of the issue, what I've found generally is the 
statute of limitations is — can be a bar to a 
counterclaim, but it cannot — it does not necessarily 
apply to defenses. In other words — 
THE COURT: I think as a general rule, that's 
correct. 
MR. CALL: Right. 
THE COURT: However, we're talking about a 
refinement of that rule in the cases where defenses are in 
effect a possible separate cause of action as obviously by 
definition is the case of the one set forth in your 
counterclaim. I suppose the common sense basis for it is 
that if you think somebody has slandered you 4 0 years ago, 
and you don't do anything about it, and then they sue you 
on an independent — separate transaction 40 years later, 
you certainly can't — you're beyond the statutes for suing 
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them. 
The question is should you be permitted to raise 
that now as a defense to their just debt. And that would 
appear to be the policy underlying them. 
MR. CALL: Well, I think what the general policy 
is is that if — if two parties enter into a transaction, 
and it goes beyond the limitation, then they — you know, 
they can't raise a counterclaim. But certainly if — if — 
if they enter into it, and then one party tries to enforce 
or do something — or do something, I think the other — I 
think the other party has a right to any defenses that 
would have occurred, because they were not necessarily put 
on notice of those defenses., if. you know what I'm trying to 
say. 
In other words, they may not necessarily want to 
raise — raise the defenses until after they are — 
THE COURT: Sued. 
MR. CALL: Yeah. Under fire. 
THE COURT: Well, doesn't that contradict the 
policy of the statute of limitations, which is a statute of 
repose in cases of very old claims that witnesses have 
died, and it would be very hard to adjudicate it now that 
the parties — 
MR. CALL: Not necessarily. Because it would be 
taken into account on the bringing of the suit. And that 
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would also take into account the defenses. In other words, 
if the writing were six years, and they bring the suit, 
they'd have to bring it within the six years, and then any 
defenses to that writing, you know, could be alleged, and 
it would be within the same period. 
In other words — in other words, they may 
not — they may have — you may have defenses to something 
which has occurred, but you are not raising them, 
because — because they are not affirmatively seeking 
relief from you. And I mean otherwise you'd have to go out 
and — I mean everyone that would have a claim against 
somebody would go ahead and pursue those claims. 
THE- COURT: Well, I think that would be the 
case — if it's all the same transaction, and you're making 
payments along, you certainly wouldn't be barred from 
raising those just because you've been paying for many 
years. 
MR. CALL: In ~ 
THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Higbee on that 
point. 
MR. HIGBEE: Your Honor, my arguments on this 
point are fairly concise and to the point. And I think 
Your Honor has pretty well hit everything I wanted to 
raise. 
The first one is, Your Honor, that these are not 
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it's all kinds of headaches. And when we had a little 
problem in scheduling six weeks ago, I told Budge to get 
ready, because I had every intention of asking Your Honor 
to set it for trial before the end of the year. And I 
would still like to do that. And I believe that we're at 
the point now where after a year and a half in litigation, 
the parties ought to be able to admit or deny things. And 
I would like to go through some of these things. I think 
we'll save ourselves a lot of preparation and a lot of time 
at trial if I know where they're coming from. 
THE COURT: Well, let me make this preliminary 
statement. Based on what I've heard today and what I see 
in the file — and I want to review the files more 
carefully to make sure I'm not missing something — I will 
probably be granting partial summary judgment on everything 
except the improper disbursement on the 60,000 loan, which 
is going to be an issue I would assume that could be tried 
probably in an hour, at most. And the only reason I'm 
raising this is to kind of get a handle or an idea as to 
how long a trial might take. If that turns out to be the 
only issue on which I don't grant summary judgment, then I 
would presume that we could — and I can make that decision 
in the next 10 days — I would presume that we can have a 
trial date, depending on courtroom availability. 
THE CLERK: Do you want me to go get the 
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calendar, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: I think we'll need it. 
In about a month. I would guess that a lot of 
preparation is not going to be necessary on that single 
issue. It sounds like it's going to be a one witness on 
each side type issue. I'm just thinking out loud now, 
counsel. Feel free to break in if — 
MR. CALL: Well, Your Honor, if that's your 
inclination, then — then I would — you know, I would — 
you know, I would agree with that. 
But I mean if — if — depending on your ruling, 
I mean this could be — could be a big case. And I have 
people and out-of-state — 
THE COURT: Yeah. I don't think it's in the 
cards. I — 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: I really don't — you know, the same 
reasons that I ruled on the merits on the counterclaim I 
think are going to be applicable on the merits. At least 
some of those matters. The fair dealing, good faith and so 
forth, as defenses. And of course partial summary judgment 
can be granted with respect to a defense, either allowing 
it or excluding it. And I don't really see factual bases 
for those things anymore as a defense as I saw as an 
independent cause of action. 
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2. With respect to claims three and four, summary judgment 
is granted to plaintiff on all issues relating to the February 
10, 1987 loan except for the issues involving defendant's seventh 
defense, improper disbursement of loan funds, which will be 
tried, as well as the issue of attorney's fees. 
3. Summary judgment is granted to plaintiff on claims five, 
six, and seven, except for the issue of attorney's fees, 
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MR. HIGBEE: Okay. Unless Mr. Call wants to — 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, may I have my — 
THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Did you want to 
say — 
MR. CALL: A brief statement. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. CALL: I just wanted to — to state that in 
light of the prior ruling — rulings by this court on the 
partial motions for summary judgment, all the defendants7 
defenses have been dismissed other than their fourth 
defense for the disbursement of one loan for $60,000 that 
was made in February of 1987. And the purpose of the 
February,. 1987 loan — the 60,000 — the defendants fail. 
And we still maintain those two (Inaudible) the financial 
situation of Troy, which was created by the bank in the 
disbursement of the initial loan of $325,000. The 
defendants still maintain that they're entitled to their 
defenses as to the initial loan of 325, and if those 
defenses would not have been dismissed by the Court, they 
would be here today to testify as to those defenses. 
Today, however, the issues are limited as we 
discussed to the disbursement of one of many loans. And I 
feel the evidence today will show that the funds on the 
$60,000 loan were not disbursed in accordance with 
settlement statements and sheets that were — that were 
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1 I signed by — by Troy in filing, 
2 | The evidence that's to be presented here today 
3 I is only a small bit of the evidence of the course of 
4 conduct of the bank and their dealings with Troy which we 
5 feel and maintain support our other defenses that have been 
6 improperly dismissed by the Court on summary judgment. 
7 That's all I have, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: All right. You may call your first 
9 witness. 
10 MR. HIGBEE: Call Mr. LeLand Fife, Your Honor. 
11 If you would stand up, and Susette will swear 
12 you, and you will take the witness chair. 
13 
14 LELAND O. FIFE, 
15 the witness herein, having been 
16 first duly sworn, was examined 
17 and testified as follows: 
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
19 
20 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. HIGBEE: 
22 Q. State your name. 
23 A. LeLand 0. Fife. 
24 Q. Where do you reside, Mr. Fife? 
25 I A. St. George, Utah. 
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know — I don't have the purpose of the sum in my notes on 
that, but it was mainly for working capital* For — they 
were expanding their operation and needed working capital. 
They found their income was somewhat seasonal, and they 
needed this for sort of a bridge loan for working capital. 
Q. Isn't it true that they had lost some of their 
cash flow because of the delays on the 325 and the — 
MR. HIGBEE: I'm going to object at this point, 
Your Honor. I think — I've sort of let it go to — but I 
think he's too far afield here. I don't see how — well, 
my technical objection is relevance. 
THE COURT: Well, in view of the Court's 
previous rulings, this would seem on the surface to relate 
to the original loan. 
What is the relevance to the remaining issue of 
disbursement of the 60,000 loan? 
MR. CALL: I'm trying to get — I'm trying to 
get the parties' understanding on the disbursement of the 
$60,000 loan. 
THE COURT: Well, at this point until I see how 
that understanding is related to the questions that you are 
now asking, I'll sustain the objection. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
Q. Isn't it true that the reason you loaned the 
$40,000 was to satisfy Mike Kehl on the previous loan? 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
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May 7 , 1985 
Jack H. Carpenter 
292 West 1000 North 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-4522 
*^8& 
Lee F i f e 
State Bank of Southern Utah 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Dear Mr. Fife, 
At your request, and for the purpose of estimating the fair 
market value of the property known as: 
Troy Hygro System 
NewCastle, Utah 
I have made a thorough investigation and analysis of matters 
pertaining to value as reported herein. 
The property rights appraised herein are the Fee Simple. 
Details are as shown in the attached report. 
In my opinion, the Fair Market Value of the property described 
above, as of May 3, 1985, is: 
Five Hundred Sixty Two Thousand Dollars 
$562,000.00 
I certify that I have no interest, present or contemplated, 
in the property and that neither the employment to make 
the appraisal, nor the compensation, is contingent on the 
value of the property. I have personally inspected the 
property and according to my knowledge and belief, all 
statements and information in this report are true and 
correct, subject to the underlying assumption and contingent 
conditions stated. 
pectf ulJ*y submitted, 
acK H. Carpenter, CA-S 
JC/jrc 
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THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484) 
CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
250 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 726 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
(801) 586-4404 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. 
KEHL; DONALD K. KEKL; 
LENORE F. KEKL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEKL and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. ] 
KEHL; LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH ] 
KEHL; KAREN SUE KEHL, 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. ; 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH, ] 
a Utah Banking Corporation, ] 
Counterclaim ] 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
) LEE FIFE 
i Civil No. 90CSG1153 
i Judge J. Philip Eves 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
LEE FIFE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. This affiant is an individual currently residing in St. 
George, Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. At all times relevant to this case, this affiant was a 
vice-president of State Bank of Southern Utah and was the bank 
officer designated to deal with the Troy Hygro loans which are at 
issue in these proceedings. 
3. This affiant was personally involved in each of the 
conversations, communications, and other matters outlined in this 
affidavit, and thus this affidavit is made upon this affiant fs 
personal knowledge. 
4. This affiant was initially approached by Troy Hygro, for 
the purpose of arranging financing, for the construction of 
greenhouses operated near New Castle in western Iron County. 
5. After a few meetings with Troy Hygro representatives, 
primarily Jim Markell, the parties began working towards the 
consummation of a financing arrangement. Early on in the 
process, the initial plans changed in that originally Troy Hygro 
was only going to borrow enough money to finance the construction 
of additional greenhouses on property already leased from Boyd 
Christensen. Along the line, it became necessary to finance 
enough for both the construction of the greenhouses and the 
purchase of the property from Christensen. The final loan figure 
was $3 25,000, which included funds for the purchase of the 
property and construction of the greenhouses. 
2 
6. Between the date of the initial contact, as outlined 
above, and the date the loan was actually completed, the parties 
worked together, in the usual and customary manner, to complete 
the loan package* The parties gathered financial information, 
obtained appraisals on the property, worked out easement and 
title questions, and similar things. 
7. As with any loan, neither of the parties to this 
transaction were bound until the papers were actually signed and 
the funds disbursed. Neither myself, nor any other officer at 
State Bank to my knowledge, ever promised, committed or affirmed 
in any way that the loan would in fact be granted, nor any 
specific date when the funds would be advanced. 
8. In the banking industry, absent a firm commitment 
letter, loans are preliminary until the documents are acutally 
signed and the funds advanced. Many times there are conditions 
which need to be satisfied right up to the date of closing. 
Since the borrower is never bound to complete the loan, the bank 
considers the loans to be preliminary until the funds are 
actually advanced. 
9. In this case, Troy Hygro was never bound to complete the 
loan until the actual signature of the documents and advancement 
of the funds. 
10. Some time after July 1985, the pressure to get the loan 
completed increased. State Bank was aware of Troy Hygro1s needs, 
and moved the loan process forward as quickly as possible. The 
loan package was submitted to the Small Business Administration 
3 
of the United States Government (the "SBA") for approval, which 
all parties knew was a condition to completing the loan. 
11. SBA authorization was received in writing on September 
3, 1985. However, by the time the SBA authorization was given, 
State Bank had other existing loans outstanding up to the maximum 
allowed by the regulatory limits governing State Bank. 
Therefore, State Bank could not immediately lend the funds 
pursuant to the SBA approval. 
12. As soon as I notified Jim Markell that: the S3A approval 
had been given, but that State Bank did not have sufficient funds 
to lend, I encouraged him to seek financing elsewhere. I gave 
him thp SBA approval and gave him the names of other banks thar 
may be able to complete the SBA loan. S3A approvals are readily 
assignable and can be used through any appropriately regulated 
bank. 
13. During the negotiation process, from the initial 
contact in February of 1985 to the time of the SBA approval on 
September 3, 1985, State Bank did not know it would be out of 
money when the SBA approval was granted. Obviously, the 
institution's lending ability varies from time to time. It was 
not until approximately 30 days prior to September 3, 1985 that 
the Bank's lending ability became tight. 
14. Even after the Bank's financial situation became 
strained, this affiant hoped that when the SBA approval was 
granted it would be in a position to lend the funds. Since I did 
4 
not know when the SBA would be given and since I did not know 
what other loans were in process, I did not know for certain 
until the actual day of the SBA approval what the Bank's 
financial situation would be on the date the approval was given. 
15. As soon as the SBA approval was given, and it became 
apparent that there were no funds available to advance, State 
Bank moved as quickly as it could to remedy the situation. 
Within approximately 30 days State Bank was able to locate an 
investor for the loan, and the loan was closed on or about 
October 7, 1985. 
16. Even though the Bank was not able to fund this loan as 
quickly as either the Bank or Troy Hyqro wanted, there was never 
a time when State Bank was not doing its best to get the loan 
completed. In loans like this, it is impossible to make a 
commitment as to when the loan will be granted. There are so 
many variable factors, such as those coming to light in this 
case, that, absent a commitment letter, loans are not 
obligations of either party until they are completed. 
17. Some time in 1986 Troy Hygro began to experience cash 
flow problems and approached State Bank for an additional loan. 
To remedy the cash flow shortage, on February 10, 1987, State 
Bank loaned an additional $60,000 to Troy Hygro. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this Ak6]'day of March, 1992. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jr" 
1992. 
Notary Pub<Jn.c • '' 
My Commission Expires: (I ip/~j «g?v3^ , / 7 7*$ 
Residing At: X ^ V-4_^-t^7^ ^ 7 * ~ 
:c H3CCA "V Wiiiavw \^Jj? a 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF LEE FIFE to Budge W. Call at BROWN 
& BROWN, 505 East 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 by first 
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STATE RAXKOF SOUTHERN UTAH 
26 North Man • Cedar oty, uca>> 34720 • (SO'.) 535-3456 
February 20, 1937 
Troy Kygrc-Systens, Inc. 
4 06~ Highly ES 
Ease Troy, tfis. 53120 
Attention: Gloria Kehl 
Dear Gloria: 
re l i ev ing i s a breakdown on the 560,000.00 SBA guaranteed lean: 
- spcs i t ed to azzz. in 
Cedar Citv 4 ,? : : .00 
Paid Lean"-49359-2 17,766.59 (Prmc. 17,294.35 •«• Ir.t . $432.24) 
Paid Loan -5077^-2 15,113.15 (? rmc . 15,000.00 T I " . Silc.15) 
lean 7<BZS 1 279.00 
Total $£:.»:;:.co 
The lean fees consisted of tne relieving: 
Title ;:ork - S154.00 
Kez. L Pel. - 50.00 
Appraisal - 65.00 
UCC Filings - 10.00 
Lien Search - 10.00 
Postage - 30.00 
Guaranty fee 960.00 (This fee is charged by SEA and is 2% of the 
30* c\^ Lrar.taed portion) 
Enclosed are several documents that need co be signed and returned to us. 
SBA Kote showing the change in die payment ejsount frou ?996.00 to S1004.00, 
Condensation Agreement to be signed and returned 
Settlement Sheet to be signed and returned 
Authorization & Loan Agreement (photo copy is for your file) 
Federal Debt Collection Policies Form to be signed and returned. 




SBA Loan Secretary 
enc. 
Tab J 
1 2 4 6 - 1 2 5 2 Wash. 824 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
briefing falls far below the high standards 
of professionalism of the firm in question 
and we do not expect such errors will be 
repeated. Nevertheless, in this instance, 
the briefing errors wasted the time of op-
posing counsel and hampered the work of 
the court Accordingly, the violations of 
the rules will not go unnoticed and unsanc-
tioned. 
AGED and BAKER, JJ., concur. 
Editor's Note: The opinion of the 
Washington Court of Appeals in 
Anderson v. Texxann Industries, Inc., 
published in the advance sheet at this 
citation, 824 P.2d 1246-1252, was with-
drawn from the bound volume at the 
request of the Court 
64 WashApp. 401 
jjpiSEATTLE FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
N A , a national banking association, 
Respondent and Cross Appellant, 
v. 
James R. SIEBOL and Patricia D. 
Siebol, husband and wife, d/b/a 
Pourhouse Tavern, Appellants, 
and Bleyhl Farm Service, Inc^ an Oregon 
corporation; State of Washington De-
partment of Employment Security; and 
State of Washington Department of 
Revenue, Defendants. 
No. 10961-5-m. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 3. 
Feb. 25, 1992. 
Lender brought foreclosure action 
against borrowers seeking recovery on 
loans secured by borrowers' real property. 
Borrowers counterclaimed for damages al-
legedly resulting from lender's breach of 
ils oral promise to provide improvement 
and inventory financing for borrowers1 
used automobile dealership. The Superior 
Court, Yakima County, Heather Van Nuys, 
J., granted foreclosure, granted borrowers 
equitable setoff for lost profits, and limited 
recoupment of lost profits to first year of 
operation. Lender and borrowers appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Shields, CJ., 
held that (1) statute of limitation on bor-
rowers' counterclaim was not tolled under 
continuing relationship doctrine; (2) bor-
rowers were entitled to equitable offset; 
(3) damage award representing borrowers' 
lost profits was supported by evidence; 
and (4) lender was entitled to award of 
attorneys fees. 
Affirmed. 
1. Limitation of Actions <s=>46(6) 
"Continuing relationship doctrine/' 
which tolls statute of limitation on claims 
by clients against professionals until pro-
fessional relationship is terminated, did not 
apply to claim by borrower against lender 
for damages allegedly resulting from lend-
er's breach of its oral promise to provide 
inventory financing for borrower's used car 
dealership. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Limitation of Actions «=>40(1) 
Statutes of limitation never run 
against defenses arising out of transac-
tions sued upon. 
3. Limitation of Actions *»41 
Defense of recoupment is not barred 
by statute of limitation so long as main 
action itself is timely; defense goes to jus-
tice of plaintiffs claim and, although no 
affirmative judgment can be had, recoup-
ment is available as defense even when 
barred as affirmative cause of action. 
4. Mortgages *»415(1) 
Borrowers were entitled to assert lend-
er's alleged breach of oral promise to pro-
vide financing as affirmative defense in 
action by lender to recover on loans se-
cured by borrowers' real property where 
borrowers entered into loan agreement 
based upon loan officer's representation 
that loan would include amounts for pur-
chase of inventory, borrowers leased land 
and spent $60,000 on improvements based 
SEATTLE FIRST NAT. BANK, N.A. v. SIEBOL Wash. 1253 
Cite as 824 PJd 1252 (W—hApp- 1992) 
upon oral loan commitment, and borrowers awarded equitable offset against lender's 
acted in part based upon previous course of recovery based upon lender's breach of oral 
dealings between borrowers and lender. promise. 
5. Estoppel <*=>85 
Lost profits are recoverable in promis-
sory estoppel cases as long as there is 
substantial and sufficient factual basis sup-
porting amount awarded; fact that busi-
ness is new does not preclude recovery for 
lost profits if they may be reasonably esti-
mated through market condition analysis of 
similar, but profitable, businesses in vicini-
ty, operating under substantially same con-
ditions. 
6. Damages e»190 
Borrowers established lost profits re-
sulting from lender's breach of oral com-
mitment to loan borrowers funds for used 
automobile dealership; expert witnesses 
for both lender and borrowers testified re-
garding borrowers' actual losses, national 
industry averages, and local used automo-
bile dealerships, both experts were certified 
public accountants who used similar meth-
ods, and court's lost profits award was 
between projections of two experts. 
7. Damages «=>190 
Decision to limit lost profits damages 
for breach of oral loan commitment to one 
year was supported by evidence that lend-
er's extension of credit to borrowers, in 
form of secured note amortized on 15-year 
schedule, was subject to annual review, and 
that note was technically due in one year. 
8. Costs «=>194.16 
Attorney fees may be awarded only 
when authorized by private agreement, 
statute, or recognized ground of equity. 
9. Bills and Notes <*=>534 
Costs «=>194^ 2 
Mortgages *»377, 581(2) 
Lender was entitled to award of attor-
ney fees in action against borrowers to 
collect under terms of promissory notes, 
mortgages, security interests, and deeds of 
trust, where those documents expressly 
provided for costs of collection, including 
attorney fees, even though borrowers were 
1. Mr. Siebol operated a used car lot in Union 
*Gap during the 1960*s and had maintained his 
license ever since, keeping a few used cars for 
l4oaJohn J. Carroll, John S. Moore, Veli-
kanje, Moore & Shore, Yakima, for appel-
lants. 
Don W. Schussler, Halverson & Apple-
gate, Yakima, for respondent and cross 
appellant 
SHIELDS, Chief Judge. 
Seattle First National Bank (Seafirst) in-
stituted foreclosure proceedings to recover 
on secured loans it made to James R. and 
Patricia D. Siebol. After a bench trial, the 
court entered judgment for Seafirst in the 
amount of $431,858.49 plus interest, $50,-
000 in attorney fees, $106.20 in costs, and 
foreclosed the deeds of trust securing the 
debt However, the court granted the Sie-
bols an offset of $34,364 in damages result-
ing from Mr. Siebol's detrimental reliance 
on the bank's promise to provide financing 
for lot improvement and purchase of inven-
tory for a new business venture. The Sie-
bols appeal the amount of the offset and 
the award of attorney fees; the bank cross-
appeals the award of the offset and its 
amount We affirm. 
Late in 1982, Mr. Siebol decided to re-
enter the used car business in Yakima.1 
His assets consisted of the Pourhouse Tav-
ern in Yakima, a seller's contract on the 
Caribou Motel in Oroville, a Circle-L gas 
station/minimart in Sunnyside and adjacent 
6- and 60-acre ranches in the Yakima area. 
He later acquired a contract on a 35-acre 
leased orchard. 
Mr. Siebol had banked with Seafirst since 
1977 and loan officer Terry Wheat had 
been handling his accounts since April 
1982. In January 1983, Mr. Siebol met 
with Mr. Wheat to discuss financing for his 
proposed dealership. Mr. Siebol represent-
ed he would need $50,000 for improvements 
to the lot he planned to lease and $250,000 
for used car ^ inventory. There are varia-
tions in the testimony of both Mr. Wheat 
and Mr. Siebol regarding the total amount 
the bank would loan Mr. Siebol; however, 
sale at a Circle-L gas staaon/minimart he 
owned. 
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the two pages of the bank's records which 
possibly could resolve the issue are miss-
ing. The court found Mr. Wheat represent-
ed to Mr. Siebol that he could obtain loans 
for him in those amounts, either as flooring 
and/or a line of credit,2 and that those 
loans would be in addition to approximately 
$117,000 which Mr. Siebol owed the bank at 
that time. Relying on Mr. Wheat's assur-
ances, Mr. Siebol proceeded with necessary 
lot improvements and opened his used car 
business in April 1983. 
At approximately the same time, Mr. 
Wheat submitted a flooring plan to the 
bank department in Seattle which handled 
that type of financing. On April 18, 1983, 
Mr. Siebol signed a master note for a credit 
line not to exceed $244,000, including the 
existing $117,799.77 debt which was rolled 
over into the note. As security, the bank 
took an assignment of the Caribou Motel 
contract and deed, and a first mortgage on 
the Pourhouse Tavern. 
After the car lot opened, Mr. Wheat in-
formed Mr. Siebol the bank would not floor 
his used car inventory, nor would it extend 
an additional line of credit Although Mr. 
Wheat indicated he would continue trying 
to obtain financing for him, the court found 
Mr. Siebol knew in May 1983 he would not 
be receiving the entire amount promised 
for lot improvement and used car invento-
ry. The court further found Mr. Siebol 
received an additional $115,000 through ad-
vances used to cover overdrafts,3 for a 
total of $359,000. "In effect, [Mr. Siebol] 
never received $58,000.00 of the funds 
[$417,000] he believed were to be made 
available to him in April, 1983", and which 
he reasonably anticipated. 
On April 16, 1984, Mr. Siebol's $244,000 
credit line and overdrafts were rolled over 
into a new secured $309,000 t4osnote and a 
new unsecured $50,000 note. Payments on 
the secured note were amortized on a 15-
year schedule subject to an annual review, 
but the note was technically due in 1 year. 
Additional security was taken in the form 
of a second mortgage on the Circle-L gas 
station/minimart and an assignment of the 
2. The local branch could not approve dealer 
flooring, but could approve a line of credit 
The finding implies the loan was not contingent 
on flooring approval. 
i Circle-L lease proceeds. Ultimately, Seaf-
r irst held a security interest in all of the 
;- Siebols' real property. 
8
 From July 1987, Mr. Siebol was unable to 
? make his loan payments to Seafirst In 
s
 October, Seafirst supervisory personnel in 
F Spokane directed Mr. Wheat to make writ-
t ten demand on the Siebols for payment of 
•" the $378,312.12 then owed plus $10,338.70 
f in interest Mr. Wheat did so by letter 
r
 dated October 16, 1987, demanding pay-
ment in full by October 22. Seafirst filed a 
summons and complaint for foreclosure on 
* November 24. The Siebols counter-claimed 
1 for damages, including lost profits, alleg-
, edly resulting from the bank's breach of its 
oral promise to provide $300,000 in im-
s provement and inventory financing. They 
1 also asserted the breach as an affirmative 
: defense. 
1
 The case was tried October 9-11, 1989, 
1
 with additional proceedings on the issue of 
damages on November 1,1989 and January 
- 2, 1990. The Siebols did not challenge the 
* foreclosure, which the court granted. 
1 Most of the trial involved the Siebols' coun-
terclaim and affirmative defense. The 
court ruled the counterclaim for affirma-
l tive relief was barred by the statute of 
: limitation, but granted an equitable setoff 
1 on the affirmative defense for lost profits 
' on a theory of promissory estoppel. The 
I court limited recoupment of lost profits to 
- the first year of operation because the ex-
i tension of credit would have been reviewa-
I ble at the end of that period and the bank 
t could have refused to renew it 
Four issues are presented by the appeal 
and cross appeal: 
(1) Whether Mr. Wheat's ongoing efforts 
| to obtain additional financing for the Sie-
bols tolled the statute of limitation on their 
counterclaim under the continuing relation-
ship doctrine; 
14oe(2) Whether the court's equitable off-
set based upon a theory of promissory es-
toppel was appropriate; 
(3) Whether the court erred in awarding 
the Siebols $34,364 for lost profits; and 
3. Mr. Siebol was permitted to overdraft his ac-
count as an interim form of financing the pur-
chase of additional inventory while Mr. Wheat 
tried to arrange additional funding. 
SEATTLE FIRST NAT. BANK, NJL v. 
O U M 8 2 4 M d 1252 (WathJIpp. 1992) 
SIEBOL Wash. 1255 
(4) Whether the court erred in awarding 
attorney fees to the bank. 
SIEBOLS' COUNTERCLAIM 
The bank started foreclosure proceedings 
on November 24, 1987. On January 11, 
1988, the Siebols asserted their counter-
claim based on the bank's alleged breach of 
an oral promise to provide inventory financ-
ing. The bank argued the statute of limita-
tion barred the counterclaim; the court 
agreed. The Siebols concede the 3-year 
limitation in RCW 416.080 applies to the 
counterclaim because Mr. Siebol knew in 
May 1983 the financing originally promised 
was not forthcoming. However, they seek 
an affirmative judgment exceeding Seaf-
irstfs claim, contending they fit within the 
"continuous relationship" doctrine which 
tolls the statute of limitation untfl the rela-
tionship between the parties is terminated. 
Hermann v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 17 WashApp. 626, 564 P.2d 
817 (1977)4 and cases from other jurisdic-
tions. 
Washington cases do not directly address 
the continuing relationship doctrine. Other 
jurisdictions have held it applies to doctors, 
attorneys, dentists, architects, accountants, 
surveyors, executors and investment advis-
ors whenuwthe professional relationship is 
a continuing one. The purpose of the doc-
trine is discussed in Greene v. Greene, 56 
N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496 
(1982). Greene, 451 N.Y.S. at 50, 436 
N.E.2d at 500, notes the doctrine was first 
recognized in medical malpractice cases, 
then extended to other professionals and 
also applied to equitable claims: 
In a broader sense the rule recognizes 
that a person seeking professional assist-
ance has a right to repose confidence in 
the professional's ability and good faith, 
4. In Hermann, the plaintiffs argued the 3-year 
statute of limitation on their claim against a 
stockbroker for negligence and mishandling of 
their accounts was tolled and did not begin to 
run until the date the relationship between the 
parties was terminated, premised on the fact the 
relationship between the parties was a continu-
ing one. Hermann, at 628, 564 P.2d 817. With-
out comment on the continuing relationship 
doctrine, Hermann held at page 630, 564 P.2d 
817: 
The determination of the exact date that the 
plaintiffs discovered the defendants' wrongdo-
and realistically cannot be expected to 
question and assess the techniques em-
ployed or the manner in which the servic-
es are rendered. 
(Citation omitted.) 
[1] The Siebols argue the ongoing rela-
tionship in this case fits within the purpose 
of the doctrine. The Hermann case ap-
plied the discovery rule to allegations of 
stockbroker malpractice and seemed to ac-
cept, without explanation or elaboration, 
that a continuing relationship could toll the 
statute of limitation. See Herrhann, at 
628, 630. It did not involve bank loans. 
Nor do we find any cases from other juris-
dictions which have applied the doctrine to 
a situation involving a commercial bank 
loan officer and a customer. We decline 
the invitation to adopt or extend the doc-
trine to these facts. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
[2,3] The Siebols also raised the bank's 
alleged breach of an oral promise as an 
affirmative defense. Statutes of limitation 
never run against defenses arising out of 
the transactions sued upon. Allis-Chal-
mers Corp. v. North Bonneville, 113 
Wash.2d 108, 112, 775 P.2d 953 (1989). 
One such defense, recoupment, is not 
barred by the statute of limitation so long 
as the main action itself is timely. 51 
AmJur.2d Limitation of Actions § 77, at 
656 (1970). The defense goes to the justice 
of the plaintiffs claim, and although no 
affirmative judgment can be had, recoup-
ment is available as a defense even when 
barred as an affirmative cause of action. 
20 AmJur.2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, 
and Setoff §§ 10 and 11, at 235-36 (1965). 
[4] UosHere, the court rejected the Sie-
bols' suggestion Mr. Wheat's oral promise 
ing, or in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have discovered such wrongdoing, is a 
factual question for determination by the jury 
and, likewise, if there is evidence to support 
plaintiffs' claim that the relationship was a 
continuing one so that the statute is tolled 
until the relationship is terminated, is also a 
factual question to be submitted to the jury on 
proper instructions. 
(Italics ours.) 
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constituted a contract to lend money,6 but 
found the bank answerable on a theory of 
promissory estoppel. 
Promissory estoppel requires five ele-
ments: (1) A promise which (2) the prom-
isor should reasonably expect to cause 
the promisee to change his position and 
(3) which does cause the promisee to 
change his position (4) justifiably relying 
upon the promise, in such a manner that 
(5) injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. 
Farm Crop Energy, Inc. v. Old Natl, 
Bank, 38 Wash.App. 50, 52, 685 P.2d 1097 
(1984) (quoting Corbit v. J.I. Case Co., 70 
Washed 522, 539, 424 P.2d 290 (1967)), 
rev'don other grounds, 109 Wash.2d 923, 
750 P.2d 231 (1988). 
The court's findings of fact upon which 
the equitable remedy is based are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. The find-
ings support the court's conclusion an eq-
uitable offset is warranted on the basis of 
promissory estoppel. Mr. Wheat's repre-
sentations constituted a promise upon 
which he knew Mr. Siebol was relying. 
Mr. Siebol leased a lot and spent $60,000 on 
improvements based on the oral loan com-
mitment; he would not have borrowed 
money from Seafirst to open a new busi-
ness had it not promised to finance his used 
car inventory. Based on the parties'agree-
ment and his previous course of dealings 
with the bank, Mr. Siebol's change of posi-
tion was justified and it would be unjust 
not to enforce the promise. 
LOST PROFITS 
[5] Lost profits are recoverable in 
promissory estoppel cases as long as there 
is a substantial and sufficient factual basis 
supporting the amount awarded. That the 
business is new does not preclude recovery 
for lost profits if they may be reasonably 
estimated through market condition analy-
sis of similar, but profitable, businesses in 
the vicinity, operating under substantially 
the same conditions. Farm Crop\^Ener-
5. Seafirst's arguments the court should have 
concluded the alleged oral contract failed for 
lack of certainty are, therefore, pointless. 
6.« The court did not find a breach of a contract 
to lend money, thus contract cases limiting 
gy, 109 Wash.2d at 927-28, 685 P.2d 1097; 
Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co., 65 
Wash.2d 1, 11, 19, 390 P.2d 677, 396 P.2d 
879 (1964). 
[6] Here, the Siebols' expert provided a 
framework using Mr. Siebol's actual losses 
and national industry averages, while Seaf-
irst's expert provided details regarding lo-
cal businesses. Both experts are certified 
public accountants who used similar meth-
ods: one arrived at a figure of $65,000, and 
the other, a figure of $20,400. In the end, 
the court fashioned an equitable remedy.* 
The court's award is between the projec-
tions of the two experts; we will not dis-
turb it 
[7] The court's decision to limit dam-
ages to 1 year is supported by its finding 
the extension of credit would have been 
nonrevolving and reviewable at the end of 
the first year. Substantial evidence sup-
ports the finding. The court's remedy is 
equitable, which is the goal in a promissory 
estoppel case. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
[8,9] The Siebols contend Seafirst 
should not have been awarded attorney 
fees because most of the trial focused on 
their counterclaim and affirmative defense, 
and the amount of the equitable offset 
awarded as recoupment They argue Seaf-
irst was not the prevailing party on the 
issue of promissory estoppel: it did not 
improve its position at trial and had an 
offset judgment entered against it The 
argument is without merit Attorney fees 
may be awarded only when authorized by a 
private agreement, statute, or a recognized 
ground of equity. Clark v. Horse Racing 
Comm'n, 106 Wash.2d 84, 720 P.2d 831 
(1986). Pursuant to RCW 4.84.330, the pre-
vailing party in an action to enforce or 
defend a contract is entitled to attorney 
fees and costs when the contract so pro-
vides. Seafirst sued to collect under the 
terms of the Siebols' promissory notes, 
mortgages, security interests, and deeds of 
damages to expenses associated with making 
another loan do not apply. See footnote 5 and 
associated text Furthermore, the Siebols were 
unable to obtain inventory financing elsewhere 
due to the concentrated debt at Seafirst 
STATE v. WEBB 
CUe as 824 PJd 1257 (WaahJIpp. 1992) 
Wash. 1257 
t rust Those documents expressly provide 
for costs Uioof collection including attorney 
fees. The award of an equitable offset 
does not make the Siebols a prevailing par-
ty entitled to fees under RCW 4.84.330. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
THOMPSON, J., and STAUFFACHER, 
J., pro tern., concur. 
( O | KEY NUMKR SYSTEM > 
64 WashApp. 480 
l48oSTATE of Washington, Respondent, 
v. 
Richard D. WEBB, Appellant 
No. 25693-9-1. 
Court of Appeals of Washington, 
Division 1. 
March 2, 1992. 
As Amended on Denial of Reconsideration 
March 31, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted of second-de-
gree burglary and second-degree malicious 
mischief, following jury trial in the Superi-
or Court, Snohomish County, Richard T. 
Thorpe, J., and defendant appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Pekelis, J., held that (1) 
statement to police was not product of im-
proper custodial interrogation; (2) error, if 
any, in admitting testimony by wife as to 
husband's statement was harmless; (3) 
community property interest in property 
damaged does not preclude prosecution for 
malicious mischief; and (4) burglary and 
malicious mischief offenses should have 
been treated as constituting same criminal 
conduct for purpose of computing offender 
score under sentencing guidelines. 
Conviction affirmed, and remanded for 
resentencing. 
1. Criminal Law «=>412.1(4) 
Statement to police by custodial bur-
glary defendant who had requested counsel 
that the stuff he had damaged also be-
longed to him was not made in response to 
improper interrogation, even though defen-
dant's statement followed officer's alleged 
response to defendant's question as to 
whether booking him was necessary, 
"You're damn right this is necessary. You 
went in and vandalized (victim's) apart-
ment"; officer's alleged statement was rea-
sonable response to defendant's inquiry, 
did not call for response from defendant, 
and officer could not have known that his 
alleged statement would elicit incriminating 
response. tLS.CA. ConstAmend 5. 
2. Criminal Law «=>412.2(3) 
Constitutional proscription against 
compelled self-incrimination requires that 
any custodial interrogation of suspect be 
preceded by advice that suspect has right 
to presence of attorney. U.S.C.A. Const 
Amend. 5. 
3. Criminal Law e»41&2(4) 
If custodial suspect requests attorney, 
interrogation must cease until attorney is 
present U.S.C.A. ConstAmend 5. 
4. Witnesses e»188(l) 
Marital testimonial privilege prevents 
spouse from being examined as witness for 
or against other spouse without consent of 
other spouse. Wesf s RCWA 5.60.060(1). 
5. Witnesses «=>192, 195 
Marital communications privilege ap-
plies to confidential communications be-
tween spouses during marriage; to fall 
within privilege, communication must have 
been induced by marriage relationship, and 
the privilege survives dissolution and 
death. Wesf s RCWA 5.60.060(1). 
6. Witnesses «=>53(3) 
Statutory exception to marital commu-
nications privilege for statements regard-
ing crime committed by one spouse against 
the other is limited to cases where crime 
committed against testifying spouse is one 
of personal violence. West's RCWA 5.60.-
060(1). 
7. Criminal Law C1170VX1) 
Error in admitting wife's testimony of 
husband's threats, in violation of marital 
TabK 
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her verbal and behavorial symptoms indi-
cated she was in all probability a victim of 
sexual abuse.25 
Wanda Lairby's testimony did not reveal 
that she was vindictive toward her ex-hus-
band or that she harbored-any fear that 
she would be unable to gain permanent 
custody of her children. We conclude 
there was substantial credible evidence 
supporting defendants' convictions. 
The verdicts below are affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
STEWART and HOWE, JJ., concur in the 
result 
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate 
herein. 
Joyce K. JACOBSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
• . 
Lorna K. BUNKER and William 
Frederick Rigby, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 18922. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 28, 1985. 
Sisters who had each borrowed money 
from their father on promissory notes and 
inherited shares of the balance remaining 
on each note after his death brought ac-
tions against each other to recover 
amounts due. The Fourth District Court, 
Millard County, J. Harlan Burns, J., award-
ed $236.49 to one sister who had filed coun-
terclaim to original action, and the other 
25. His opinion was reinforced, he testified, by 
the report of a clinical psychologist, Christine 
Swanson. She was a witness at trial, but her 
sister appealed asserting that under Cali-
fornia law the counterclaim was time 
barred. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) California law applied, and (2) 
in absence of appropriate references to the 
applicable law, that law would be presumed 
to be the same as Utah law, and setoff 
would be allowed up to the extent of claim 
made, but no affirmative relief was allowed 
on the time-barred counterclaim. 
Reversed. 
1. Set-Off and Counterclaim <s=>2 
California law governed outcome of 
case involving offsetting claims on promis-
sory notes where each note was executed 
in California. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-45. 
2. Bills and Notes «=>117 
Legal effect of promissory notes is 
governed by the law of the jurisdiction 
where they are executed and delivered. 
3. Set-Off and Counterclaim <s=»41 
Under California law, where parties 
each had promissory notes from the other 
and had made cross demands on them, de-
mand barred by statute of limitations 
would only be barred to the extent that it 
was greater than the opposmg claim. 
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 431.70. 
4. Evidence <£=>80(1) 
In absence of appropriate references to 
the applicable law of foreign jurisdiction, 
that law will be presumed to be the same 
as Utah law. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-45. 
5. Limitation of Actions <$=>41 
Where sisters had claims against each 
other on promissory notes, amount due one 
sister on the note could be used as an 
offset against the amount owed the other 
up to the amount of the note, but sister 
was not entitled to affirmative relief on the 
offsetting time-barred counterclaim for the 
amount owed in excess of the offset. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(i). 
opinion was excluded on the erroneous objec-
tion of defense counsel that it contained hear-
say. 
JACOBSEN V. BUNKER 
Cite M 699 P.2d 1*08 (Utah 1985) 
Utah 1209 
Dexter L. Anderson, Fillmore, for plain-
tiff and appellant 
Robert D. Atwood, Logan, for defend-
ants and respondents. 
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for Bunker. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The plaintiff, Joyce K. Jacobsen, appeals 
from a judgment which awarded $236.49 to 
the defendant, Lorna K. Bunker, and which 
held defendant William Rigby not liable as 
an indemnitor. We reverse and remand for 
entry of judgment in accordance with this 
opinion. 
The plaintiff Jacobsen and the defendant 
Bunker are sisters. In the 1960's, Jacob-
sen and Bunker each borrowed money from 
their father and signed promissory notes as 
evidence of their indebtedness; neither 
note was ever discharged. Jacobsen's last 
payment on her note was made October 15, 
1973; Bunker's last payment was made 
January 5,1976. In 1976 their father died, 
and one-third of the balance remaining on 
each note was distributed on July 7, 1977, 
to each sister and to a surviving brother. 
On August 15,1978, Jacobsen sued Bunker 
for her one-third share of the balance due 
on the Bunker note. Bunker counter-
claimed for one-third of the balance due on 
the Jacobsen note. Jacobsen joined as a 
defendant her ex-husband, William Rigby, 
to pay the amount due on her note, if any, 
pursuant to a "hold harmless" clause in a 
divorce decree which dissolved the mar-
riage between Jacobsen and Rigby. 
The trial court offset the amount Jacob-
sen owed on her note against the amount 
owed her on the Bunker note and awarded 
Bunker a judgment for $236.49, the differ-
ence in the amounts owed on the two notes. 
The trial court also ruled that defendant 
Rigby was not liable on plaintiffs note 
because of a settlement agreement exe-
cuted subsequent to the divorce decree. 
On appeal, Jacobsen's main contention is 
that the California four-year statute of 
limitations for actions on written instru-
ments, Cal.Civ.Proc.Code section 337 (Deer-
ing 1972), bars Bunker's counterclaim. Ja-
cobsen asserts that according to California 
law, the statute ran from the date of her 
last payment on October 15, 1973 and ac-
cordingly the last date that Bunker could 
have brought her counterclaim was Octo-
ber 15, 1977. 
[1,2] The law of California governs the 
outcome of this case. Both litigants' notes 
were executed and payable in California. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, section 78-12-45 
provides: 
When a cause of action has arisen in 
another state or territory, or in a foreign 
country, and by the laws thereof an ac-
tion thereon cannot there be maintained 
against a person by reason of the lapse 
of time, an action thereon shall not be 
maintained against him in this state, ex-
cept in favor of one who has been a 
citizen of this state and who has held the 
cause of action from the time it accrued. 
"[W]here a contract is entered into and is 
to be performed in a foreign jurisdiction 
the law of that jurisdiction should be ap-
plied...." Morris v. Sykes, Utah, 624 
P.2d 681, 683-84 (1981). The rule is the 
same for promissory notes. Their legal 
effect is governed by the law of the juris-
diction where they are executed and deliv-
ered. Bologna Brothers v. Morrissey, La. 
App., 154 So.2d 455, 459 (1963). 
Jacobsen argues that the California stat-
ute of limitations bars the counterclaims 
even though it acts as a set-off. As au-
thority, plaintiff cites 51 AmJur.2d Limi-
tations of Actions § 78 at 657 (1970) 
which states: 
In the absence of a statute to the con-
trary, a demand pleaded by way of a 
set-off, counterclaim, or crossclaim is re-
garded as an affirmative action in most 
jurisdiction and therefore, unlike a mat-
ter of pure defense, is subject to the 
operation of the statute of limitations, 
and is unavailable if barred. [Footnotes 
omitted.] 
Bunker contends that a set-off is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, citing 
several Utah cases which have allowed set-
offs based on claims that would otherwise 
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have been barred by the statute of limita-
tions. 
[3,4] Neither party has cited any Cali-
fornia law on this issue.1 In the absence of 
appropriate references to the applicable 
law of a foreign jurisdiction, that law* will 
be presumed to be the same as Utah law. 
Booth v. Crompton, Utah, 583 P.2d 82 
(1978); Maple v. Maple, Utah, 566 P.2d 
1229 (1977). 
[5] Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power 
Co., 82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281 (1932), held 
that if a defendant had a counterclaim that 
otherwise would have been barred by a 
statute of limitations, the counterclaim 
could be set-off against the plaintiffs 
claim, notwithstanding the statute of limi-
tations. The Court's analysis was based on 
Comp.Laws of Utah section 6578 (1917) 
which provided in relevant part: 
When cross-demands have existed be-
tween persons under such circumstances 
that, if one had brought an action 
against the other, a counterclaim could 
have been set up, the two demands shall 
be deemed compensated so far as they 
equal each other 
See also Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler, 
105 Utah 529, 144 P.2d 276 (1943); Annot., 
1 A.L.R.2d 630, § 13 (1948). 
Rule 13(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure adopted that law. That rule 
provides in part: "When cross demands 
have existed between persons under such 
circumstances that, if one had brought an 
action against the other, a counterclaim 
could have been set up, the two demands 
shall be deemed compensated so far as 
they equal each other " Pursuant to 
that rule, the amount due Bunker on the 
Jacobsen note may be used as an offset 
against the amount owed Jacobsen. How-
ever, Bunker is not entitled to affirmative 
relief on the offsetting counterclaim under 
1. If California law were to be applied, defendant 
Bunker's action would only be barred to the 
extent it is greater than the plaintiffs claim. 
See Cal.Civ.Code § 431.70 (Deering 1972) which 
provides in relevant part: 
Where cross-demands for money have existed 
between persons at any point in time when 
neither demand was barred by the statute of 
Rule 13(i). Accordingly, the judgment for 
$236.49 is reversed. 
Because of our ruling on the effect of a 
set-off, we need not reach the issue of 
Rigby's obligation, if any. 
Reversed. Costs to appellant. 
HALL, CJ., and HOWE, DURHAM and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE COM-
PANY, an Indiana corporation, Plain-
tiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah 
public transit district, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 18945. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 6, 1985. 
Insurer of passenger on public transit 
authority bus brought action against public 
transit authority seeking indemnification 
for uninsured motorist payments that in-
surer had made to its insured. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Philip R. 
Fishier, J., entered summary judgment in 
favor of public transit authority, and insur-
er appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, 
J., held that public transit authority, as a 
qualified self-insurer, was not required to 
provide uninsured motorist coverage for its 
passengers. 
Affirmed. 
Zimmerman, J., concurred and filed an 
opinion in which Durham, J., joined. 
liinitations, and an action is thereafter com-
menced by one such person, the other person 
may assert in his answer the defense of pay-
ment in that the two demands are compensat-
ed so far as they equal each other, notwith-
standing that an independent action asserting 
his claim would at the time of filing the an-
swer be barred by the statute of limitations. 
TabL 
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Delbcrt M. YERGENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Emmett D. FORD and N. E. Ferguson, dba 
Ford & Ferguson, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 10196. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 9, 1965. 
Action to renew judgment. The 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, R. L. Tuckett, J., dismissed action on 
ground that it was barred by limitations, 
and the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Callister, J., held that limitation 
period in actions on judgment is not tolled 
by provisions of statute tolling limitations 
period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment in actions founded on contract. 
Judgment affirmed. 
I. Limitation of Actions C=>I39 
Common law rule tolling limitation 
period in case of acknowledgment or part 
payment in all actions is not applicable to 
action to renew judgment in view of stat-
utory modification of common law rule re-
stricting tolling of limitations to actions 
founded upon contract U.C.A.1953, 68-
3-2, 78-12-44. 
2. Limitation of Actions <§=>I39 
"Case founded on contract" within 
statute providing for tolling of limitation 
period in case of acknowledgment or of 
part payment in action founded upon con-
tract does not include judgment founded 
on note, since final judgment for payment 
of money extinguishes original claim on 
note. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Judgment <S=?582, 583 
When valid and final judgment for 
payment of money is rendered, original 
claim is extinguished, and new cause of 
action on judgment is substituted for it, 
and in such case, original claim loses its 
character and identity and is merged in 
judgment. 
4. Limitation of Actions <&=?I39 
Doctrine relating to acknowledgment 
or part payment tolling period of limitations 
applies only to cases founded upon assump-
sit and has no application where, action 
does not rest upon a promise. 
5. Limitation of Actions <&=I39 
To suspend operation of statute of 
limitations by acknowledgment, part pay-
ment or new promise, obligation on which 
action is based must be founded upon prom-
ise and must not be in debt or covenant or 
in actions in effect the same. 
6. Judgment €=902 
In action on judgment, debt is proper 
form of action, and assumpsit will not lie 
to enforce judgment. 
7. Limitation of Actions <3=»I39 
Judgment is not "contract'' within stat-
ute tolling limitations in cise of acknowl-
edgment or part payment in action founded 
upon contract. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22, 7&-
12-23, 78-12-44. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
8. Execution <§=>! 
Judgment <&=900 
Money judgment forms basis for but 
two legal proceedings: suit thereon brought 
within eight years wherein judgment forms 
basis or chose in action for judgment or 
some form of proceeding in execution for 
collection. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
69(a). 
9. Limitation of Actions @=I39 
Limitation period in actions on judg-
ment is not tolled by provisions of statute 
tolling limitation period in case of acknowl-
edgment or part payment in actions found-
ed on contract. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-22, 7Z-
12-44, 78-22-1. 
Richards, Bird & Hart, Salt Lake City,, 
for appellant. 
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Christensen, Paulson & Taylor, Provo, 
for respondents. 
CALLISTER, Justice. 
This is an action to renew a judgment 
almost eight years and five months after 
the date of its entry. The lower court 
dismissed the action upon the ground that 
it was barred by the statute of limitations.1 
The judgment in question was rendered 
on September 15, 1949 in an action upon 
three promissory notes. On April 18, 1950, 
the defendants (judgment debtors), in order 
to secure a lien release, entered into a 
written agreement acknowledging the ob-
ligation and thereafter made payments to-
taling $450. The last payment was made on 
October 10, 1950. The instant action was 
commenced on February 5,1958—more than 
eight years after judgment, but less than 
eight years after the acknowledgment and 
part payment. 
Plaintiff first argues that inasmuch as 
Utah has no statute specifically providing 
that an acknowledgment or pait payment 
will not toll the limitation of Section 78-12-
22, the common law should prevail.2 How-
ever, this state has modified the common 
law rule 3 by the enactment of Section 78-
12-44, U.CA.1953 which provides: 
"In any case founded on contract, 
when any p n of the principal or inter-
est shall have been paid, or an ac-
knowledgment of an existing liability, 
•debt or claim, or any promise to pay 
the same, shall have been made, an 
action may be brought within the pe-
Tiod prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgment or promise; 
but such acknowledgment or promise 
-must be in writing, signed by the party 
1. 78-12-22, U.CA.1953: "Within eight 
years: An action upon a judgment or 
decree of any court of the United States, 
or of any state or territory within the 
United States." 
2. 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, § 
333f p. 262. 
3. For a discussion of this rule, see Olson 
v. Dahl. 99 Minn. 433, 109 N.W. 1001, 
8 L.R.A.,N.S., 444 (1906). 
402 P 2d—44Vi 
to be charged thereby. When a right 
of action is barred by the provisions 
of any statute, it shall be unavailable 
either as a cause of action or ground of 
defense." 
[1] Whereas the common law rule tolls 
the limitation period in case of an ac-
knowledgment or part payment in all ac-
tions, the foregoing statute restricts it only 
to those actions founded upon contract. 
Furthermore, a reasonable interpretation of 
the last sentence of this statute would com-
pel the conclusion that any statute which 
bars a right of action is conclusive unless 
its operation is suspended by the specific 
provisions of 78-12-44.4 
It is next argued by plaintiff that the 
phrase, "In any case founded on contract," 
contained in 78-12-44 includes the judg-
ment in the instant action because it was 
founded upon the promissory notes. In 
effect, the plaintiff claims that the debt 
(contract upon which his judgment was 
rendered is revived so that it retains its 
original character and thus falls withm the 
tolling provisions of 78-12-44. 
[2,3] This argument is without merit, 
for when a valid and final judgment for the 
payment of money is rendered, the original 
claim is extinguished, and a new cause of 
action on the judgment js substituted for 
it. In such a case, the original claim loses 
its character and identity and is merged in 
the judgment.5 
Finally, plaintiff contends that the word 
"contract," as used in 78-12-44 includes 
judgments and thus the limitation period 
of 78-12-22 may be tolled. 
There is a division of authority as to 
whether a judgment is considered to be a 
4. 68-3-2, U.CA.1953: "The rule of the 
common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this 
state. * * *" 
5. Restatement of Judgments, § 47. 
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contract within the meaning of the limita-
tion statutes.6 We adopt the view that it 
is not and an action thereon is not ex 
contractu. 
[4—7] The doctrine relating to acknowl-
edgment or part payment applies only to 
cases founded upon assumpsit and has no 
application where the action does not rest 
upon a promise.7 To suspend the operation 
of the statute, the obligation upon which the 
action is based must be founded upon a 
promise and must not be in debt or covenant 
or in actions in effect the same. In an ac-
tion on a judgment, debt is the proper form 
of action, and assumpsit will not lie to 
enforce it.8 Therefore, since an action on 
a judgment will not lie in assumpsit and the 
rule tolling the statute applies only to con-
tracts based on a promise enforceable in 
assumpsit, a judgment is not a contract 
within the meaning of the limitation stat-
utes. 
That the legislature did not intend a judg-
ment to be construed as a contract is evi-
denced by the fact that it limited actions 
upon a written contract to six years9 and 
actions upon a judgment to eight years, thus 
treating them separately. 
[8] A money judgment forms the basis 
for but two legal proceedings: (1) a suit 
thereon, brought within eight years, where-
in it forms the basis or chose in action for 
a new judgment, or (2) some form of pro-
ceeding in execution for collection.10 Rule 
69(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides that process to enforce a judgment 
shall be by writ of execution which may 
issue at any time within eight years after 
the entry of judgment. Thus, there is 
6. 45 A.L.R.2d 968-984; 34 Am.Jur., Lim-
itation of Actions, § 335, p. 264. 
7. Wood on Limitations (4th Ed.) § 66. 
8. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 851, p. 423; 7 
C.J.S. Assumpsit, Action of § 7, p. 113. 
9. 78-12-23, U.C.A.1953. 
10. Youngdale v. Burton, 102 Utah 169, 128 
P.2d 1053 (1942). 
imposed an eight-year limitation period on 
the two basic legal proceedings on a judg-
ment, without any indication of an intent 
upon the part of the legislature to extend 
the period by part payment or written ac-
knowledgment. 
[9] There is also a strong policy argu-
ment for holding that the limitation period 
on actions on judgments is not tolled by the 
provisions of 78-12-44. It is provided in 
Section 78-22-1, U.C.A.1953, that from the 
time a judgment is docketed it becomes a 
lien upon all real property of the judgment 
debtor, both in the county where the judg-
ment is entered and in any other county 
of the state where the judgment is filed and 
docketed. This lien continues for a period 
of eight years unless the judgment is satis-
fied or the enforcement is stayed 
A contract is ordinarily not a matter of 
public record and the tolling of the statute 
of limitations as provided in 78-12-44 
would have no significant effect except upon 
the parties to the contract. By contrast, 
a judgment is a public record, and this 
record is relied upon to determine the status 
of legal title to real property. A written 
acknowledgment or a part payment would 
not ordinarily be reflected upon the official 
records and, if they could extend the limita-
tion period on judgments, it would not be 
possible to ascertain from the public records 
a correct assessment of the legal title to 
real property. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
of the lower court is affirmed.11 Costs to 
defendants. 
HENRIOD, C. J , and McDONOUGH, 
CROCKETT, and WADE, JJ., concur. 
II. For excellent discussions upholding this 
view, see: Sharp v. Sharp, 154 Kan. 175, 
117 P.2d 561 (1941); LaSalle Exten-
sion Univ. v. Barr, 19 N.J.Misc. 387, 20 
A.2d 609 (1941); Giordano v. Wolcott, 
46 N.J.Super. 278, 134 A.2d 593 (1957); 
Mutual Trust & Deposit Co. v. Boone 
(Ky.), 267 S.W.2d 751, 45 A.L.R.2d 
962 (1954). 
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general terms the conditions under wYnch a 
petition for that purpose may be filed with 
the County Commission for approval. We 
do not see this as an improper delegation 
of legislative authority to the County Com-
mission, but as conforming with the consti-
tutional mandate that "the legislature by 
general laws shall provide for the incorpo-
ration . . . of cities and towns in pro-
portion to population . . . ." 8 
[8] On the basis of what we have said 
herein we are in accord with the views of 
the trial court m rejecting the petitioners' 
contentions, and in refusing to find that 
the County Commission had acted beyond 
its authority or so wholly without reason 
as to be capricious and arbitrary and justi-
fy the issuance of a writ of mandamus.9 
(All emphasis added.) 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT, 
HENRIOD, and ELLETT, JJ , concur. 
: KEY NUHICI smut s> 
28 Utah 2d 125 
Carl T. EVANS, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PICKETT BROS. FARMS, a partnership, 
and Jess W. Pickett, otherwise known as 
J. W. Pickett, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 12616. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
June 26, 1972 
Action to recover unpaid balance on a 
contract for work plaintiff performed m 
leveling land owned by defendant. The 
Fifth District Court, Iron County, J. Har-
lan Burns, J., rendered judgment for plain-
tiff, and defendant appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Calhster, C J., held that 
where parties conducted preliminary nego-
8 Ibid. 
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trations -with respect to ptemtiii's \eveYmg 
of land owned by defendant, and after 
completion of the work, the parties execut-
ed written contract which set forth amount 
of remuneration that plaintiff was to re-
ceive for services he had previously ren-
dered, and thereafter the agricultural stabi-
lization and conservation service prepared 
a written form that reqited that defendant 
had received services, the total price, and 
the share to be paid by the government, 
there was an obligation to pay which was 
founded upon a written instrument, and 
hence plaintiffs action was governed by 
six-year statute of limitation pertaining to 
instrument in writing, rather than four-
year statute of limitations pertaining to 
oral contracts 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
Limitation of Actions $=>24(2) 
Where parties conducted prehminar> 
negotiations with respect to plaintiffs lev-
eling of land owned by defendant, and aft-
er completion of the work, the parties exe-
cuted written contract which set forth 
amount of remuneration that plaintiff was 
to receive for services he had previousl) 
rendered, and thereafter the agricultural 
stabilization and conservation service pre-
pared a written form that recited that de-
fendant had received services, the total 
price, and the share to be paid by the gov-
ernment, there was an obligation to pay 
which was founded upon a written instru-
ment, and hence plaintiff's action to re-
cover unpaid balance was governed by 
six-year statute of limitation pertaining to 
instruments m writing, rather than four-
year statute of limitation pertaining to oral 
contracts. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-23, 78-12-
25. 
Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for de-
fendants-appellants. 
Durham Morris, Cedar City, for plain-
tiff-respondent 
9. See authorities footnote 3 above. 
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CALL1STER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff initiated this action to recover 
the unpaid balance on a contract for work 
he performed in leveling 40 acres of land 
owned by defendant. Defendant pleaded 
both the four-year (Sec. 78-12-25, U.C.A. 
1953) and six-year (78-12-23, U!C.A.1953) 
statutes of limitation. Upon trial before 
the court, judgment for the plaintiff was 
rendered, and defendant appeals therefrom. 
J. W. Pickett represented the partnership 
in the transactions which ultimately led to 
this action and will hereinafter be referred 
to as defendant. In the autumn of 1959, 
plaintiff and defendant went over the area 
defendant desired to have leveled on the 
farm. They discussed the price and plain-
tiff suggested that the hourly rate of $10 
per hour was less expensive than a cubic-
yardage rate. Plaintiff estimated the cost 
at approximately $1,800. Thereafter de-
fendant made an application to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, since under one of its 
programs the government would pay a por-
tion of the cost. The Soil Conservation 
Service performed certain engineering 
work; defendant assisted in staking the 
area to be leveled. An engineering work 
sheet was prepared, which indicated the 
amount of dirt to be removed; defendant 
approved this sheet. Defendant contacted 
plaintiff to proceed with the work; the 
leveling was done between November 1 
and November 29, 1959. Thereafter, to ef-
fect payment, a written form was prepared 
by the Agricultural Stabilization and Con-
servation Service (A.S.C.). This docu-
ment was entitled Purchase Order For 
Conservation Materials And Service; it 
specified that the vendor was Carl Evans, 
and the farmer was Pickett Brothers 
Farms. The form specified that the ven-
dor was authorized to furnish the farmer 
named with the conservation materials or 
services described in Section II, and that 
delivery must be completed before Decem-
ber 15, 1959. Section II indicated the 
acreage leveled and the cubic yardage in-
volved, and that the sales price was $10 
per hour. The total maximum cost was 
listed as $2,465, and the maximum payment 
by the government was designated as 
$1,000. After completion of Sections I and 
II, the document was submitted to defend-
ant. Section III provided that the materi-
als or services described in Section II had 
been received and would be used in carry-
ing out the approved practices under the 
Agricultural Conservation Program for 
which they were furnished. Defendant 
signed and dated the form. 
Subsequently, the government paid 
$1,000. Defendant made payments of $100 
on April 26, 1960, and $300 on September 
3, 1961. On January 2, 1962, defendant 
sent plaintiff a check for $700, which was 
specially endorsed thereon that it was pay-
ment in full. Plaintiff refused to present 
the check for payment and insisted that de-
fendant owed a balance of $1,065. The in-
stant action was filed on October 11, 1967. 
The trial court found that plaintiff's 
claim was governed by Section 78-12-23, 
U.C.A. 1953, the six-year limitation upon 
any contract, obligation or liability founded 
upon an instrument in writing. The trial 
court found that the limitation period com-
menced anew upon payment of $300 on 
September 3, 1961. The statute was tolled 
from January 2, 1962, to April 1, 1962, 
when both partners were outside of the 
state. The trial court, therefore, deter-
mined that plaintiffs action was not 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
Upon appeal, defendant asserts that the 
trial court erred in its determination that 
the six-year rather than the four-year stat-
ute of limitations controlled. Defendant 
asserts that the leveling was done pursuant 
to an oral contract, and that an action 
thereon must be commenced within four 
years as provided in Section 78-12-25, U. 
C.A.1953. 
In Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co.1 this 
court stated that a cause of action is 
founded upon an instrument in writing 
when the contract, obligation, or liability 
I. 95 Utah 490, 500-501, 80 P.2d 471 (1938). 
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grows out of the written instrument, not obligation to pay 
remotely or ultimately, but immediately. 
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In the instant action, the parties con-
ducted certain preliminary negotiations, 
and plaintiff proffered an estimate of cost. 
Subsequently, the engineering work was 
performed and the exact work to be done 
was specified in the engineering sheet. At 
this time defendant requested plaintiff to 
perform the leveling in accordance with 
the engineering sheet. After completion of 
the work, the parties executed the written 
instrument, which set the amount of remu-
neration that plaintiff was to receive for 
the services he had previously rendered.2 
The purchase order recited that defendant 
had received the services described in Sec-
tion II; Section II specified the total 
price, and the share to be paid by the gov-
ernment. Under the facts specified in this 
instrument, the law will imply an obliga-
tion to pay. Since this instrument stated 
the facts from which the law implied an 
this obligation was 
founded upon a written instrument within 
Section 78-12-23, U.C.A.1953. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs are awarded to plaintiff. 
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCK-
ETT, J J., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The parties orally agreed for the plain-
tiff to level some land belonging to the de-
fendants, and pursuant to that agreement 
the work was completed on November 29, 
1959. Thereafter, to wit, on December 11, 
1959, the Agricultural Conservation Pro-
gram Service filled out a purchase order 
for services showing that the plaintiff was 
authorized to receive a maximum payment 
from the government of $1,000. The mate-




Material or Service Specifications 
See ACP Handbook for Utah 
(e) 














18,372 c. y. 
Maximum Payment By Farmer 
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Section III the materials or services described in Section II, columns (a) and (c). were received 
by me and will be or have been used in carrying out the approved practices under the Agricul-
tural Conservation Program for which they were furnished. I certify that the price paid to the 
vendor does not exceed the difference between the fair price, if applicable, and the payment 
by the Government. 
(Sgd.) Pickett Bros. Farms by 
J. W. Pickett, Mgr. 
It is thus apparent to me that the docu-
ment is not a written contract. It would 
be some evidence of what some of the 
terms of the oral contract might be. The 
document seems to me to be the same as 
the one which might be given by me to a 
benefactor who tells me he will pay one-
half of my obligation to the yard boy if I 
2. '* . . . Where, however, services are 
rendered because requested as a matter 
of business and where consequently there 
is a contemporaneous promise implied in 
fact to pay for them, the weight of au-
thority supports the validity of a subse-
quent promise defining the extent of the 
promisor's undertaking." 1 Williston on 
Contracts (3d Ed.), § 146, p. 633; also 
see Sargent v. Crandall, 143 Colo. 199, 
352 P.2d 676, 677 (1960) ; 17 Am.Jur. 
2d Contracts, § 127, p. 474. 
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will only sign a statement saying that the 
work was done. That does not convert the 
oral contract between me and the yard boy 
into a written contract 
We are not here concerned with the 
question of whether the document might be 
a sufficient memorandum to avoid the stat-
ute of frauds, for the statute of frauds is 
not involved. 
I think the contract in the instant matter 
was oral and the defense of the statute of 
limitations is good, and I would reverse the 
judgment rendered and award costs to the 
appellants. 
O I KEY NUMBEI SYSTf H 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Rondo EASTMOND, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 12789. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 11, 1972. 
Appeal from an order of the Third 
District Juvenile Court, Utah County, Paul 
C. Keller, J., committing defendant to the 
Utah State Industrial School for an of-
fense which if committed by an adult 
would be second-degree burglary. The Su-
preme Court, Crockett, J., held that where 
police officer, at about 3:00 o'clock a. m., 
observed the lights of an automobile flash 
on and the automobile pull away from 
medical clinic, where, after stopping the 
automobile and questioning three teenage 
boys therein, he allowed it to proceed, and 
where, after checking the medical clinic a 
few minutes later, he discovered a broken 
window and an unlocked door, the officer 
was justified in radioing a request to have 
the boys' automobile stopped and, upon ar-
riving at the scene, arresting the boys on 
suspicion of burglary; likewise, the 
search of the automobile incident to the ar-
rest was proper. 
Affirmed. 
I. Arrest <§»63(4) 
In performing his duties as authorized 
by statute relating to warrantless arrests, a 
police officer is not required to meet any 
such standard of perfection as to demand 
an absolutely certain judgment before he 
may act; rather, the test to be applied is 
one which is reasonable and practical un-
der the circumstances: whether a reason-
able and prudent man in his position would 
be justified in believing facts which would 
warrant making the arrest. U.C.A.1953, 
77-13-3. 
2. Criminal Law C= 1158(4) 
In ruling on the admissibility of evi-
dence obtained as the result of a warrant-
less arrest, questions as to the validity of 
the arrest and the justification for any 
search made in connection therewith are 
primarily for the trial court; and on ap-
peal the Supreme Court will respect that 
preogative and not upset the trial judge's 
determination unless it clearly appears that 
he was in error. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-3. 
3. Arrest @»63(4), 71.1(5) 
Where police officer, at about 3:00 
o'clock a. m.,. observed the lights of an 
automobile flash on and the automobile 
pull away from medical clinic, where, after 
stopping the automobile and questioning 
three teenage boys therein, he allowed it to 
proceed, and where, after checking the 
medical clinic a few minutes later, he dis-
covered a broken window and an unlocked 
door, the officer was justified in radioing 
a request to have the boys' automobile 
stopped and, upon arriving at the scene, 
arresting the boys on suspicion of burgla-
ry; likewise, the search of the automobile 
incident to the arrest was proper. 
4. Searches and Seizures <§=>7(I0) 
Where a police officer observes some 
property in plain sight which he has good 
